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 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes represents specialised 
international arbitration forum designated for resolving international investment disputes 
between the states and foreign investors. The underlying concept of the ICSID is to encourage 
the promotion and protection of the foreign investment flows across the world. Resolving 
of international investment disputes requires balancing of the divergent interests of the host 
states and foreign investors, as any type of investor-state dispute settlement mechanism is 
inherently concerned with complex asymmetrical legal relationships. The predominantly used 
type of ISDS mechanism are ICSID arbitrations proceedings, available to the states 
via accession to the ICSID Convention. The investment disputes under ICSID arbitration 
proceedings are associated with application of bilateral and multilateral treaties providing 
for the protection of foreign investments. With regard to the voluntary nature of the arbitration 
proceedings and mutual influence of international treaties governing the substantive 
a procedural investment protection, the jurisdiction of the ICSID arbitral tribunals is subject 
to various conditions and requirements that need to be satisfied in every particular 
ICSID arbitration proceedings.  
In 2007 the Republic of Bolivia denounced the ICSID Convention, triggering the wave 
of denunciations followed by Ecuador in 2009 and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2012. 
The expressed displeasure of the states in Latin America towards the ICSID system stemmed 
from steady increasing number of ICSID arbitral awards rendered in favour of the foreign 
investors and general desire to prevent initiation of new ICSID arbitration proceedings. 
However, such unilateral release from the ICSID system gave rise to significant discrepancies 
regarding the process of denunciation of the ICSID Convention and its effects on jurisdiction 
of ICSID Tribunals. In both legal theory and practice distinct interpretation approaches emerged 
resulting either in allowing the host state to release from jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre 
and thus deprive the foreign investor of arbitration forum or compelling the host state to submit 
to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre and face the responsibility for its actions.  
Following the wave of denunciations of the ICSID Convention, the same states 
in the Latin America unilaterally terminated the Bilateral Investment Treaties providing 
the substantive and procedural protection of foreign investments. Similarly to the denunciations 
of the ICSID Convention, different views and approaches emerged towards the effects 
of unilateral termination of BITs on the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals. In light of the 
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recent changes in procedural investment protection regime within the territory of the European 
Union, particular legal issues arisen in connection with consensual termination of BITs and its 
effects on jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre. The multilateral agreement for termination of all 
of the BITs concluded between the member states of the European Union significantly 
adversely affected the access of the foreign investors to the ICSID arbitration forum including 
highly disputed retrospective impacts.  
Both unilateral and consensual termination of international investment agreements 
represents significant intervention into the procedural protection of foreign investment. 
Termination of the ICSID Convention or respective BITs may result in potential evasion 
of responsibilities of the host state arising from his unlawful conduct and includes high risk 
for the foreign investors in losing the ability to have their investment claim heard in ICSID 
arbitration forum. The effects of termination on the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre vary 
in relation to different types of termination, nature of the particular investment agreement 
and existence of specific type of clauses incorporated into the BITs. The purpose of this study 
is to firstly elaborate on provided consents of the parties to ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
the essential requirement for establishment of jurisdiction of any ICSID Tribunal. Subsequently 
the study analyses termination of international investment agreements with special emphasis 
put on distinct effects of denunciation, unilateral and consensual termination of the ICSID 






1.1. Research questions 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides 
institutional and procedural framework for arbitration and conciliation proceedings in disputes 
between host states and private foreign investors. ICSID represents dominant arbitral forum 
in the area of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)1. Since the establishment of ICSID 
in 1966, the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States2 (ICSID Convention) has been ratified by 155 Contracting 
States3. Given its specific institutional and procedural framework stemming from multilateral 
treaty regime, ICSID arbitration proceedings are subject to distinctive jurisdictional conditions.  
As many other multilateral treaties, the ICSID Convention offers mechanism 
for the Contracting State to denounce the ICSID Convention. Such sovereign act of the host 
state, however, may have serious implications on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal 
in particular investment dispute. Given contradictory wording of the ICSID Convention 
provisions governing the process of denunciation, neither academics nor judiciary possess 
unified views on when the denunciation takes effect and whether the jurisdictional requirements 
are satisfied. The ICSID Convention introduces six-month time lag4, of which interpretation 
resulted in contradictory decisions of ICSID Tribunals, as to whether the investor’s claim fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre. Based on such theoretical discrepancies, conclusions 
as to whether the jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal is established may vary with regard 
to distinctive approaches analysed in three periods of time, i.e. prior to six-month time lag, 
throughout its duration and after the time lag elapses. The question therefore arises, 
within which stated periods of time can be jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal established, 
regardless of host state denunciation of the ICSID Convention.  
 
1   UNCTAD (2020). Investment dispute settlement navigator. Arbitral rules and administering institution 
(https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement, last accessed on 16 November 2020).  
 
2  Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, signed 18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966.  
 
3  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). Resources. Rules and Regulations 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/rules-and-regulations/convention/overview, last accessed on 15 
November 2020).  
 
4  The ICSID Convention, art. 71.  
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In addition to mere denunciation of the ICSID Convention, other factors and acts 
of the host state may adversely affect jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal. In cases where 
investor’s claim stems from violation of Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) concluded between 
host state and home state of the investor, jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal is also subject 
to another jurisdictional requirements originating from particular BIT. As any other contracting 
party, the host state has a right to terminate the BIT. Such unilateral termination of BIT is 
governed by provisions of investment treaty itself and may trigger various implications 
dependent on specific types of clauses contained in BIT. Apart from unilateral termination 
of BIT, the host state may enter into agreement with home state of the investor to consensually 
terminate BIT. Even though these two acts of the host state appear to have similar 
consequences, their impact on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal in particular investment 
dispute may be entirely different. Such considerations give rise to a question, whether 
consensual or unilateral termination of BIT by the host state may have adverse effect on ICSID 
jurisdiction and therefore deprive the investor of ICSID arbitral forum in particular dispute. It 
is common practice for BITs to contain standard clauses aiming to secure the same purpose, 
such as so-called sunset clauses. As existence of such clauses in the BIT may significantly 
influence the outcomes of a research, reasonable amount of discussion will be given to stated 
type of clauses and its effects on ICSID jurisdiction as well.  
In view of all introduced discrepancies, the aim of this thesis is to assess and answer 
following questions:  
 
1. What are the requirements and conditions for establishment of the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Tribunal a what type of clauses in the BITs may adversely affect 
the jurisdiction? 
2. When and under what circumstances does the ICSID Tribunal have jurisdiction 
over the investment dispute if the host state denounces the ICSID Convention? 
3. What effect does have the unilateral and consensual termination of the BIT 
on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal? 
 
1.2. Sources and method 
 
In order to answer stated research questions, the study firstly resorts to primary sources 
of international public law. This study provides for legal analyses and assessments 
of multilateral and bilateral international treaties related to ICSID arbitration and investment 
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protection, as well as procedural rules of selected arbitral institutions. Legal analyses further 
elaborated also stem from relevant decisions of international arbitral tribunals and international 
courts, whose decisions had been concerned with denunciation and termination of international 
treaties, ICSID jurisdiction and investment disputes as such. Besides the international treaties 
and case law, the study elaborates relevant international customs.  
The legal analyses provided in the study are further supplemented with publications, 
commentaries and academic articles of internationally renowned experts in the field 
of international investment law and investment arbitration. Despite smaller range of case law 
dealing with jurisdictional implications of termination of international investment agreements, 
there is significant inconsistency in the ICSID Tribunals’ rulings. Even though there is 
considerable amount of academic articles elaborating contradicting decisions of the ICSID 
Tribunals, such academic articles focuses solely on denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
or unilateral termination of BIT. As there is no publication that would comprehensively 
elaborate jurisdictional implications of termination of international investment agreements 
by the host state, this thesis aims to provide legal analysis of both unilateral and consensual 
termination of the ICSID Convention and BIT, accompanied by analyses of selected types 
of standard BIT clauses and their effect on ICSID jurisdiction. 
For the research questions to be promptly assessed and answered, this study relies 
on method of analysis5 in cases of examination of multilateral and bilateral treaty provisions 
and decisions of arbitral tribunals and international courts. In order to assess coherence 
or inconsistency of arbitral tribunals’ decisions and reasonings related to similar factual 
and legal backgrounds, the method of synthesis6 is applied. Further the thesis uses the method 
of deduction7 when applying the academic legal theory in particular model scenarios, and 
also the method of generalisation8 when confronting particular reasonings of arbitral tribunals 
with academic legal theory. The method of comparison9 can be also found in this study, 
particularly in assessment of different types of arbitration proceedings.   
With regard to the terminology, in the interest of clarity it should be noted that 
whenever the study refers to “termination”, such term covers both denunciation of the ICSID 
 




7  Ibid., p. 74.  
 
8  Ibid., p. 72. 
 
9  Ibid., p. 87. 
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Convention as well as unilateral and consensual termination of the BIT. Should the text apply 
solely to one of the stated forms of termination, the study will indicate otherwise. The term 
“international investment agreements” is comprised of both BITs as well as the ICSID 
Convention. When the analysis shall refer solely to the ICISD Convention or the BITs as such, 
this paper will expressly indicate so.  
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
 
The paper is comprised of four chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic 
of the thesis and presents three research questions concerned with the jurisdictional 
requirements and conditions, termination of international investment agreements by the host 
state and its jurisdictional implications. The first chapter further describes the primary 
and secondary sources of international law on which the study relies on, followed 
by the description of scientific methods being used for legal analyses. The final parts of the first 
chapter deal with structure of the study and limitations of the paper.  
The second chapter provides for definition part of the paper that elaborates crucial 
legal institutes, such as denunciation, unilateral and consensual termination and jurisdictional 
requirements, with regard to particular significance they have in international investment 
arbitrations. The aim of the second chapter is to establish a framework of legal institutes, 
of which variations and correlations with particular international investment agreements are 
subject of subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
The third chapter addresses the first and second research question. The first research 
question addresses the requirements and conditions of the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal 
together with analysis of standardised types of BIT clauses capable to adversely affect 
the jurisdiction. The second research question elaborates the implications of denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention by the host state on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal in particular 
investment dispute. The first section referring to situations prior to denunciation of the ICSID 
Convention is followed by three sections analysing the aftermath of denunciation of the ICISD 
Convention by the host state. 
The chapter number four is devoted to the third research question 
and therefore elaborates the effects of unilateral and consensual termination of the BIT 
on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal. As termination of the BIT is generally governed 
by the provisions of the BIT itself, for the purposes of proper legal analyses this chapter further 
deals with so-called sunset clauses provisions, that are frequently used in the BITs. 
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Following the end of the chapter four, the conclusion summarises all of the findings 
and answers to the analysed research questions. 
 
1.4. Limitations of the study 
 
Disputes between host states and private foreign investors arising from violation 
of international investment agreements may be resolved before various arbitral institutions10. 
Given the specific nature of ICSID arbitral forum and its popularity, the study is limited 
to ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings. 
Even though there are different legal instruments that may give rise to initiation 
of the ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings11, with regard to the topic of this thesis, 
the study is limited to proceedings initiated through international investment agreements12, 
with specific focus on the BITs. Another reason for this limitation is that the majority 
of the disputes under ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings are initiated through 
international investment agreements13.  
The implications of termination of international investment agreements could be 
of various types. This thesis focuses solely on jurisdictional implications, in particularly 
jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione voluntatis. Implications on jurisdiction ratione 
materiae and ratione personae are not subject of this study, since termination of international 




10  E.g. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), The London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA).  
 
11  The ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings may be based on international investment agreements, national 
legislation of the host state or direct agreement between foreign investor and host state.   
 
12  For the purposes of this paragraph solely, the term “international investment agreements“ refers both to BITs 
and TIPs.   
 
13  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). The ICSID Case Load – Statistics. Issue 
2020-2 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%2
82020-2%20Edition%29%20ENG.pdf, last accessed on 22 November 2020), p. 11. 
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2. DEFINITION OF LEGAL INSTITUTES 
 
2.1. ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings   
 
The foreign investment process is inherently accompanied by divergent interests 
of foreign investors and host states. The investor’s interest in generating profits on one hand 
and host state’s interest in strengthening its economic development on the other, may collide 
and subsequently result in investment dispute. Initially, foreign investors did not have 
other choice than to have their investment dispute resolved within the instruments offered 
by host state’s national law. Besides national law, foreign investors could have requested their 
homes states for diplomatic protection, as type of protection available within the area of public 
international law. Such diplomatic protection, however, could have never been able to provide 
sufficiently effective protection of investors’ private interests, as diplomatic dialogues are 
by their very nature usually led within the interests of the home state itself.14   
The underlying idea of establishment of the ICSID in 1966 was to introduce another 
platform for foreign private investors for settlement of their investment disputes with host 
states. The ICSID aims to provide credible device for resolving of potential investment disputes, 
encouraging the foreign investor in his initial investment decisions. Option to submit claim 
to independent international tribunal often serves as a safeguard of investor’s legal certainty 
and therefore plays crucial role in general world-wide promotion and protection of the foreign 
investment.15  
The ISDS may take various forms of alternative dispute resolution, 
such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.16 The ICSID Convention 
arbitration proceedings, representing one of the most common used mechanism of ISDS, are 
arbitral proceedings resolving disputes between host states and private foreign investors. 
Arbitration within the ICSID system denotes sui generis regime characterised by strong 
independence from national legal systems of involved states, particularly with regard to conduct 
 
14  GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR, Omar E. (2004). Foreign Investment Disputes under ICSID. A Review of its Decisions 
on Jurisdiction. The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 189.  
 
15  SUBEDI, Surya P. (2008). International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing), pp. 30-31. 
 
16  GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR, Omar E. (2004). Foreign Investment Disputes under ICSID. A Review of its Decisions 




of the arbitral proceedings itself and review of issued arbitral award.17 The ICSID Convention 
arbitration proceedings are governed by the ICSID Convention, the Rules of Procedure 
for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings18, the Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings19 and the Administrative and Financial Regulations20.21  
Similarly to other forms of alternative dispute resolution, the essence 
of ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings is the valid consent of parties to have their dispute 
submitted and resolved by independent arbitral Tribunal. Consent to arbitrate of a host state 
and an investor may take various forms and usually is not even contained in one single 
document, but rather inferred from combination of specific provisions and conduct of parties 
involved. In the area of ISDS, three types of legal instruments are commonly used to provide 
consent to arbitrate within its provisions. Such legal instruments are international investment 
agreements (such as BITs or TIPs), national legislation of the host state and direct agreement 
concluded between the foreign investor and the host state.22 According to up-to-date statistics, 
seventy-six percent of the ICSID Convention arbitrations are based on international investment 
agreements provisions, sixteen percent arise from direct agreement between the host state 
and the foreign investor, and eight percent emerge from provisions contained in national 
legislation of the host state.23 Since this study limits itself to the ICSID Convention arbitrations 
based on international investment agreements provisions, the elaboration in further paragraphs 
is restricted to consent to arbitrate enshrined in BITs and TIPs. 
The aim of international investment agreements is to provide for effective protection 
of foreign direct investment. In order for such investment protection to be sufficiently 
 
17  DOUGLAS, Zachary (2009). The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 120-121. 
18  Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings (2006). 
19  Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (2006). 
 
20  Administrative and Financial Regulations (2006).  
 
21  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). Services. Arbitration. Overview of an 
Arbitration-ICSID Convention (https://icsid.worldbank.org/services/arbitration/convention/process/overview, 
last accessed on 25 November 2020). 
 
22  SCHREUER, Christoph (2005). Consent to Arbitration (updated 02/2007). Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 5 (www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=555, last accessed on 27 
November 2020), p. 1.  
 
23  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). The ICSID Case Load – Statistics. Issue 
2020-2 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%2
82020-2%20Edition%29%20ENG.pdf, last accessed on 26 November 2020), p. 11.  
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enforceable, the international investment agreements typically provide for dispute resolution 
mechanism, most commonly in a form of an arbitration clause incorporated within its wording. 
Given the voluntary nature of alternative dispute resolution, a consent given by both parties 
to arbitration is an essential requirement that need to be satisfied in any arbitration proceedings. 
As the international investment agreements are concluded between the home state 
of the investor and the host state, in which the investment was made, the particular arbitration 
clause is agreed upon between the contracting states to the international investment agreement. 
However, the parties of any potential investment dispute arising out of such investment 
agreement are the investor, as private person, and the host state, in which the investor has made 
his investment. Therefore, any international investment arbitration proceedings based 
on arbitration clause incorporated in particular investment agreement is inherently concerned 
with a special phenomenon, in legal theory known as arbitration without privity24.  
International investment agreements are instruments governed by public international 
law, setting the regimes of investment protection. Nevertheless, the principal beneficiary 
of an investment agreement is not any of the contracting states, but rather the investor himself, 
as a private person. Thus, in case of arbitration without privity it is not necessary 
for the claimant to be in a contractual relationship with the respondent. Furthermore, the breach 
of international investment agreement, concluded under the rules of public international law, 
further resolved in arbitration proceedings results in an issue of civil or commercial award. 
Such dichotomy between public and private international law denotes a significant feature 
of investment arbitrations, which secures the genuineness and clarity of the claim by allowing 
the injured private person to bring the claim against the host state responsible for the breach 
of investment agreement obligation.25  
With regard to the voluntary consensual nature of arbitration, the presence 
of agreement to arbitrate between the parties to the investment dispute represents fundamental 
requirement that need to be satisfied. Given the sui generis nature of investment disputes 
indicated above, the legal analysis of consent to arbitrate given by both parties to the dispute is 
based on offer and acceptance model, a typical instrument of civil and commercial law. 
Depending on the particular wording used in investment agreement, the host state usually make 
 
24  Term used in PAULSSON, Jan (1995). Arbitration Without Privity. ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 232-257. 
 
25  Ibid., pp. 232, 256. 
 DOUGLAS, Zachary (2009). The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 6-7. 
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an offer to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the investment agreement in prescribed forum, 
and such offer need to be subsequently duly accepted by the investor, a national of another 
contracting state to the investment agreement.26 However, application of the offer 
and acceptance model in disputes concerned with public international law element entails 
specific features and peculiarities, as opposed to offer and acceptance model used in traditional 
civil and commercial legal matters. Specifics of offer and acceptance mechanism in investment 
arbitrations based on international investment agreements will be elaborated in subsequent 
chapters of this study.  
The public international law aspects of investment arbitrations are even more 
noticeable with regard to ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings. The ICSID Convention is 
multilateral international treaty, concluded and legally effective in conformity with applicable 
rules of public international law. The signatory member states of the ICSID Convention 
are subsequently acting either as respondents or home states of the claimant in particular 
ICSID arbitration proceedings. Such interconnection between membership 
in ICSID Convention and position of a party to arbitration proceedings has effect on distinctive 
jurisdictional requirements, that need to be satisfied in order to establish jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Tribunal in any particular case. Jurisdictional requirements peculiar 
to ICSID arbitration proceedings based on international investment agreements will be 
examined in depth in following chapters of the study. 
 In general, jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal need to be assessed in three basic 
perspectives, i.e. ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis. The jurisdiction 
ratione materiae examines the type of the investment subject to the dispute, i.e. the object 
of the claim. The jurisdiction ratione personae relates to the eligibility of the national bringing 
the claim to investment arbitration. In assessment of jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Tribunal 
considers whether the concerned investment agreements are in force and therefore in effect 
as of providing investment protection invoked by claimant.27 In addition to stated perspectives, 
the ICSID Tribunal has to analyse, whether the consent to arbitrate was given on behalf of both 
parties to the investment dispute. The ICSID Tribunals also refer to the requirement of consent 
 
26  SCHREUER, Christoph (2005). Consent to Arbitration (updated 02/2007). Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 5 (www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=555, last accessed on 27 
November 2020), pp. 6-7. 
 
27  DOUGLAS, Zachary (2009). The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




as jurisdiction ratione voluntatis28, highlighting the essentiality of this requirement 
to be fulfilled in any ICSID arbitration proceedings. With regard to the topic of the thesis, 
this study will not provide deeper analysis of jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione 
personae. Since principal jurisdictional matters associated with termination of international 
investment agreements are jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione voluntatis, these 
jurisdictional requirements will be subject to extensive legal analysis in subsequent chapters 
of the study.  
  
2.2. Termination of the international investment agreements 
 
International treaties are considered the primary source of public international law. 
The VCLT29 defines an international treaty as a written agreement concluded between States 
or international organizations governed by international law, regardless its designation.30 
International treaties may take form of bilateral or multilateral agreements, where multilateral 
treaties represent modern and unique legal instruments, regulating large areas of international 
relations. Among other sources of public international law, international treaties are significant 
for its considerable higher degree of legal certainty, constituting strong stabilisation element 
of international relations.31 In an international treaty, the contracting parties by meeting of their 
wills establishes particular mutual rights and obligations, and thus create a specific ‘particular 
international law’ governing relation between those contracting parties. Essential to any 
agreement is an interlock of consents fuelled by parties’ intention to oblige themselves 
and subsequently commit themselves to fulfil the provisions of the treaty. 32  
Similarly to contracts concluded under private law, the autonomy of contracting 
parties in the domain of public international law became a principal attribute 
to any international treaty, enabling the parties to tailor their contractual rights and obligations 
as they see fit. With regard to stressed autonomy principle, the vast majority of the VCLT rules 
 
28  Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/20, Award of the Tribunal, 26 April 2017, para. 101. 
 
29  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980.  
 
30  The VLCT, art. 2(1)(a). 
 
31   KOLB, Robert (2016). The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), pp. 1, 
3-4. 
 




have residual character, i.e. its application is limited to cases where the contracting parties did 
not set different rules or where the treaty provisions remain silent. However, some VCLT rules 
cannot be derogated by the virtue of parties’ autonomy, such as pacta sunt servanda principle.33 
The VCLT defines pacta sunt servanda rule as obligation put on contracting parties to be bound 
by the treaty in force and to perform the treaty in good faith.34 Alongside with principle 
of voluntary consent and good faith, pacta sunt servanda principle is considered 
to be a cornerstone of law of treaties.35 The ICJ in its decision Nuclear Tests36 elaborated 
the relationship between pacta sunt servanda principle and good faith, arriving at a conclusion 
that principle of good faith represents the foundation of pacta sunt servanda. Principle of good 
faith and pacta sunt servanda both govern existence and binding nature of legal obligations, 
since they embody trust and confidence into international relations.37 Since pacta sunt servanda 
takes form of the general principle of international law, the parties to the agreement cannot 
consensually revoke its application. Pacta sunt servanda is therefore immune 
from any such consensual derogation based on parties’ discretion.38 
However, the pacta sunt servanda principle does not apply without any limitations. 
Art. 26 of the VCLT restricts the application of the principle only to treaties in force. The aim 
of such limitation resides in intention to specify the time period in life of a treaty, during 
which the principle shall apply. Following logical interpretation, the principle ceases to apply 
at the exact moment, when the treaty ceases to be in force. In general, a treaty ceases 
to be in force at the exact moment of its termination39, that has been conducted lawfully 
in accordance with respective provisions of the VCLT.40  
 
33  Ibid., p. 28. 
 
34  The VLCT, art. 26. 
 
35  DÖRR, Oliver, SCHMALENBACH, Kirsten (2012). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg), p. 427. 
 
36  Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France), Judgement of 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep 457. 
 
37  Ibid., para. 49. 
DÖRR, Oliver, SCHMALENBACH, Kirsten (2012). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg), p. 435. 
 
38  DÖRR, Oliver, SCHMALENBACH, Kirsten (2012). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg), p. 437. 
 
39  Apart from termination, a treaty also ceases to be in force once it becomes invalid or inoperable. Given the topic 
of this study, issues on invalidity and inoperability of the treaties will not be further elaborated.   
 
40  VILLIGER, Mark Eugen (2009). Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 365. 
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The treaty bonds, that have obligatory nature resulting from the application of pacta 
sunt servanda principle, may be unbound by way of lawful termination. Both legal theory 
and practice distinguish between different types of treaty termination. The term ‘termination’ 
is used as general designation for all types of treaty termination, irrespective of whether the act 
of termination causes extinction of the particular treaty as such or leads merely to suspension 
or withdrawal of one party from the application sphere of the treaty.41 From another point 
of view, a treaty termination may be differentiated based on circumstance, whether intention 
to terminate derives from unilateral expression of will made by one party to the treaty 
or consensual meeting of parties’ wills to jointly terminate the treaty by concluding 
an agreement on termination. With regard to the topic of this study, further elaborations will 
be focused on types of treaty termination based on latter distinction, i.e. unilateral termination 
and consensual termination. Termination of international investment agreements analysed 
from this particular perspective provides clear starting point for further elaborations dedicated 
to jurisdictional requirements affected by termination.  
 
2.2.1.  Unilateral termination of the international investment agreements 
 
Unilateral termination of a treaty by its nature emerges from unilateral expression 
of will. All types of unilateral termination of treaties are therefore concerned with a discrepancy 
consisting in termination of multilateral rights and obligations by way of exercising a unilateral 
power. Therefore, the existence of rights and obligations stemming from the parties’ treaty 
bonds is contingent on stand-alone decision made by one single party. Such unilateral exercise 
of power has enormous effect on obligations of other parties to the treaty and thus collides 
with pacta sunt servanda principle. Such collision may have a great negative impact on legal 
certainty in international relations, where treaty obligations constitute the backbone of public 
international law. For these reasons, public international law to imposes necessary limitations 
on unilateral termination of treaties.42  
Considering a great impact of unilateral termination on concluded treaty obligations 
between the parties, the question may arise, under what circumstances should be the unilateral 
termination of treaty allowed under international law. Once the parties have consensually 
agreed on conclusion of the treaty, a preferred way to bring the treaty rights and obligations 
 
41  KOLB, Robert (2016). The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), p. 206. 
 
42  Ibid., pp. 206-207.  
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to an end should be a consensual termination, i.e. by concluding agreement on termination. 
However, particular extraordinary circumstances may occur, under which it would be unjust 
for the party to not have a possibility to unilaterally terminate the treaty. To safeguard fairness 
a reasonableness in such exceptional circumstances, the international law provides special 
group of rules entitling the party to unilaterally terminate the rights and obligations arising 
out of the treaty. Legal rules related to unilateral termination in public international law 
are divided into two categories based on the source of their incorporation.  
First category consists of rules prescribed in provision of the particular treaty. 
By concluding particular treaty with provisions governing its unilateral termination, the parties 
to the treaty anticipated occurrence of circumstances that may result in party’s decision 
to unilaterally terminate its rights and obligations. Once the termination is conducted 
in accordance with particular treaty provisions, the unilateral termination is considered 
effective and in conformity with public international law. Incorporation of unilateral 
termination rules and limitations into particular treaty brings significant advantages 
to the one-sided character of this type of termination, since the legality of such unilateral power 
exercised by one party is based on previous consent given by both parties at the time 
of conclusion of the treaty. Although in such cases the termination of treaty depends 
on stand-alone decision made by one party, its collision with pacta sunt servanda principle 
is eliminated, as the parties ex ante consented to any potential unilateral termination conducted 
by one of them falling within the scope of concerned treaty provisions. Preference of unilateral 
termination rules established by provisions of treaty itself is evidenced by art. 42(2) 
and art. 54(a) of the VCLT, which state that a treaty may be terminated either based on grounds 
defined in provisions of a treaty itself, or in accordance with special provisions stated 
in the VCLT.43 
Second category covers rules governing unilateral termination prescribed 
in the provisions of the VCLT. The role of the VCLT provisions on unilateral termination 
of treaties is to provide legal framework for the party to justifiably terminate the treaty rights 
and obligations once any of the exceptional circumstances occurs. The VCLT, encompassing 
mostly residual norms of the international law of treaties, introduces the group of extraordinary 
events or circumstances that give rise to a party’s right to unilaterally terminate the treaty. 
Most of these circumstances have a common feature, that is an objective character of their 
 




origin. Thus, this type of unilateral termination, usually emerges from events that occurred 
irrespective of party’s will or intention.44 The VCLT considers as examples 
of such extraordinary circumstances, among others, material breach of the treaty by one party, 
supervening impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances.45 
As each of stated extraordinary events triggering right to unilaterally terminate the treaty 
represents some kind of severe disruption of equilibrium of parties’ rights and obligations, 
there is no doubt that each of the examples represents fair and reasonable exception 
from otherwise fully applicable pacta sunt servanda principle.  
Apart from two stated categories covering the most frequent cases of unilateral 
termination, the VCLT also provides legal framework for residual situations, in which neither 
the treaty contains any provisions governing its termination, nor any extraordinary events 
triggering right to unilateral termination occurs. The VCLT offers solution for prescribed 
situation in art. 56 by introducing two exceptions, under which the unilateral termination 
may be exercised. First, the subjective exemption, applies when parties to the treaty intended 
to include right of unilateral termination into the treaty provisions, 
nevertheless no such provision has been incorporated into final version of the treaty.46 
Such intention may be derived from analysis of preparatory works preceding a conclusion 
of the treaty or any tacitly implied option to terminate. Second, the objective exemption, may 
be relied on in cases, where the nature of the treaty implies a right of a party to unilaterally 
terminate the treaty.47 In the area of public international law several types of international 
treaties are considered not allow a contracting party to unilaterally terminate its rights 
and obligations. International practice tends to include into this category mainly international 
treaties on boundaries, statuses of territories, peace and disarmament. On the contrary, 
international treaties related to international trade, commerce and dispute settlement, 
are given their flexible nature and need for adaptability to current economic and political 
developments usually considered to fall within the scope of the objective exemption allowing 
its unilateral termination.48 With regard to international investment agreements, the nature 
 
44  Ibid., pp. 208, 220. 
 
45  The VCLT, arts. 60-62.  
 
46  The VCLT, art. 56(1)(a).  
 
47  The VCLT, art. 56(1)(b).  
 




of investment treaties is aimed to promotion and protection of investments between the states. 
From this perspective, international investment agreements tend to be flexible and adaptive 
towards international economic and political environment. Although substantial degree 
of stability is necessary in order to provide effective protection of foreign investment, 
the sensitivity of foreign investment protection granted by investment treaties to economic 
and political relations between contracting states supports the conclusion that international 
investment agreements fall within the scope of objective exemption, and thus can be unilaterally 
terminated.  
Although the public international law has developed throughout the time groups 
of rules allowing a party to international treaty unilaterally terminate its rights and obligations 
stemming from a treaty within prescribed limitations, the exercise of right of unilateral 
termination in certain situations tends to collide with other legitimate interests. Example of area, 
where such collision raises particular concerns is international investment law governed 
by bilateral investment treaties. The BITs are concluded between the host state and home state 
of the foreign investor. When it comes to unilateral termination of a BIT, the rights 
and obligations stemming from a treaty cease to provide investment protection to a foreign 
investor, a private person that is the ultimate beneficiary of terminated investment treaty. 
The issue stems from the special triangular relation between the states, being the contracting 
parties to the investment treaty, and the foreign investor, being the beneficiary of the treaty. 
Once any contracting state unilaterally terminates the investment treaty, such one-sided act, 
even though executed in full compliance with international law, causes extinction of particular 
investment treaty with all rights derived from it, including foreign investor’s investment 
protection. Such disbalance threatening investors’ rights and legitimate expectations 
may be prevented by particular safeguards introduced by the BITs, with the aim to safeguard 
investors’ protection after the termination. Further analysis of concerned issue and safeguards 
will be provided in subsequent chapters of the study. 
 
2.2.2.  Denunciation of the international investment agreements 
 
Unilateral termination of international treaties is closely connected to terms 
“denunciation” and “withdrawal”. The importance of distinguishing between unilateral 
termination and denunciation or withdrawal emerges in situations, where multilateral 
international treaties are concerned. Once the bilateral treaty is unilaterally terminated 
by one of its contracting parties, it inevitably brings the treaty existence to an end, 
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as under public international law it is forbidden for a state to hold rights and obligations 
stemming from an international treaty solely against itself. Therefore, in such cases 
the stand-alone act of unilateral termination conducted by either party to the international treaty 
results in extinction of all treaty rights and obligations.49  
However, in cases of multilateral international treaties, where number of contracting 
parties exceeds two, the unilateral termination conducted by one party does not have 
to ultimately result in treaty extinction. Once the multilateral treaty will not cease to exist 
by reason of unilateral termination, such unilateral act performed by one party will only result 
in release of respective party from its rights and obligations imposed by multilateral treaty. 
As the outcome of otherwise identical conduct substantially varies in cases of multilateral 
treaties, the legal doctrine introduces the term “denunciation”, or similarly “withdrawal”, 
when it comes to unilateral exit of a party from multilateral treaty under public international 
law. Since the rights and obligations of the contracting parties are essentially reciprocal, 
a denunciation does not only terminate rights and obligations of a denouncing party towards 
other parties, but also release other parties from their obligations towards a denouncing party. 
A denouncing party and other parties to the multilateral treaty are no longer obliged to apply 
and enforce the treaty provisions against each other.50  
In the area of international investment law, the majority of international investment 
agreements take the form of bilateral investment treaties concluded between the states 
under public international law. Nevertheless, recent trends in international investment 
protection are shifting the form of legal framework towards multilateral treaties. 
One of the reasons for this gradual transition is intention to conclude large regional free trade 
agreements51 and regional economic integration agreements. This kind of multilateral 
agreements, however, usually capture partial investment protection in comparison to traditional 
bilateral investment treaties, as they primarily focus on trade and commercial protection.52 
Another significant area of international investment law, where multilateral treaties play 
a crucial role, is international settlement of investment disputes. The aforementioned 
 
49  KOLB, Robert (2016). The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), p. 213. 
 
50  Ibid., pp. 213-214. 
 
51  E.g. NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement), 
CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and European Union). 
 
52  BALAŠ, Vladimír, ŠTURMA, Pavel (2018). Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic (Prague: Wolters 




ICSID Convention takes a form of a multilateral treaty acceded by 163 signatory 
and contracting states53, representing a legal cornerstone of most frequently used dispute 
settlement forum for international investment disputes in the world.  
Given the peculiar subject matter of the ICSID Convention that provides dispute 
resolution forum for international investment disputes, denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
executed by any of the member states may constitute serious jeopardy of foreign investors’ 
rights to have their claims heard in front of the ICSID Tribunals. Thus, denunciations 
of the ICSID Convention by either home states or host states of the investors give rise 
to complex jurisdictional issues, which will be further analysed in subsequent chapters 
of the thesis. 
 
2.2.3.  Consensual termination of the international investment agreements 
 
In contrast to unilateral termination or denunciation related to bilateral or multilateral 
treaties, a consensual termination consists in fundamentally distinct conduct of contracting 
parties. A consensual termination, synonymously also termed “termination by agreement”, 
in its designation reflects the essence of this form of treaty termination, i.e. an agreement 
between contracting parties to mutually terminate the particular treaty.  
One of the oldest and original principles of public international law was concerned 
with a lawful way how to terminate an international treaty. The rule, dated back 
into 19th century, prescribed that a treaty may be terminated or withdrawn from solely based 
on agreement made by all of the contracting parties to particular treaty. However, 
with the evolvement of international relations and development of international law adjusting 
to newly emerged situations, the stated rule cannot be applicable in current international law.54 
As elaborated in previous parts of this study, the unilateral termination of international treaties 
is permissible and effective, if conducted in accordance with rules and limitations imposed 
by either particular treaty itself or provisions of the VCLT. Nevertheless, the mere existence 
of stated 19th century rule alongside with consensual nature of this form of termination evidence 
the significance and traditional character of this legal institute.  
 
53  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2021). About ICSID. Member States. Signatory 
and Contracting States (https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-states/database-of-member-states, last 
accessed on 1 April 2021). 
 




The key provision comprising current applicable law on consensual termination 
of international treaties is art. 54(b) of the VCLT. The article entitles the parties to particular 
treaty to either terminate or withdraw from a treaty at any time, providing that such termination 
or withdrawal is exercised in the form of consent given by all parties to the treaty 
and after conducted consultation with other contracting States.55 Initial idea of allowing 
contracting parties to terminate the treaty by an agreement lies within the premise 
that contracting parties rule the fate of a treaty. Since the conclusion of a treaty is based 
completely at parties’ discretion, analogically, the extinction of a treaty shall be also fully 
dependent on parties’ consideration. The only limitation to consensual termination resides 
in the provided consent itself. In order for a consent to be valid, and thus capable of bringing 
rights and obligations of parties to the treaty to an end, it must be sufficiently clear. The clarity 
of expression of a consent is thus crucial factor to be considered in case of consensual 
termination, otherwise the application of pacta sunt servanda principle prevails, rendering 
the consensual termination of a treaty invalid. Once the consent given is sufficiently certain 
and clear, the form in which the consent is provided is irrelevant. Any form of consent, 
either express or implied, is valid and effective. The parties may enter into agreement 
on termination of a treaty, irrespective of its oral or written form. Similarly, the parties 
may tacitly terminate a treaty by their joint engagement in legally recognised act, which trigger 
the treaty termination, such as concluding a new treaty of the identical subject matter.56 
This example of tacit termination of a treaty is confirmed by art. 59(1) of the VCLT, 
which provides more detailed conditions on this type of treaty termination in order for such tacit 
termination to be legally effective.57  
In cases of consensual termination, the collision with pacta sunt servanda principle 
is the least significant, when compared to unilateral termination or denunciation. Creation 
of a new agreement inherently constitutes new rights and obligations covered by new pacta 
sunt servanda principle, that prevails over former concluded treaty bond. Nevertheless, 
however pure and non-conflicting this form of termination may appear, in case of international 
investment agreements the consequences of consensual termination may become quite harsh. 
 
55  The VCLT, art. 54(b).  
 
56  KOLB, Robert (2016). The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), pp. 208-
210. 
 
57  Art. 59(1) of the VCLT imposes two alternative conditions on the tacit termination of formerly concluded 
treaty. Either the intention of the parties must be established regarding the new treaty to govern the same subject 
matter, or the incompatibility of the new treaty provisions with the earlier treaty must be proved.  
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The problem resides in asymmetric relationship between states, the parties to investment 
agreement, and individual investors, the beneficiaries of the investment agreement and principal 
recipients of investment protection regime, established by investment treaty. 
However consensual the termination of the investment agreement was, the ultimate consent 
to terminate the rights and obligations constituting the basis of investment protection was given 
by states and not the investor, whose investment protection has been terminated. 
One of the most significant examples of consensual termination of investment treaties 
represents Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member 
States of the European Union58, by which the member states of the European Union 
consensually terminated the BITs concluded between each other.  
 
The issues with termination of international investment treaties become more complex 
especially in connection with international investment disputes. Termination of an investment 
treaty brings to an end not only substantial rights and obligations connected to investment 
protection, but also procedural rights and obligations of the parties related to investment 
protection. Vast majority of the international investment agreements contains dispute resolution 
mechanism safeguarding investor’s right to have his investment claim resolved in particular 
dispute resolution forum.  
Since this study is focused on ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings, the most 
commonly chosen dispute resolution forum for international investment disputes arising 
out of international investment agreements, particular correlations between investment treaties’ 
terminations and jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals will be examined in subsequent chapters 
of the thesis. Once the investment treaty is terminated by the contracting state, the act 
of termination may have substantial impact on investor’s right to have his investment dispute, 
arising out of breach of terminated investment treaty, resolved in ICSID arbitration 
proceedings. Each type of treaty termination, i.e. unilateral termination, denunciation 
and consensual termination of international investment agreement, even though executed 
lawfully and in accordance with all applicable rules, may result in substantially different 
decision of the ICSID Tribunal, on whether it has a jurisdiction to hear particular investment 
claim arising out of, already terminated, investment treaty. Further analysis of each type 
of termination and its distinguished effects on jurisdiction ratione temporis 
and ratione voluntatis of ICSID Tribunals will be elaborated in separate chapters of the study.   
 
58  Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European 
Union, signed 5 May 2020, in force 29 August 2020. 
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3. JURISDICTION OF THE ICSID TRIBUNAL AND 
DENUNCIATION OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
 
The foreign direct investment process consists in conduct of an investor, a private 
person domiciled or incorporated in particular state, who makes an investment in a territory 
of another state. Typically, the home state of an investor and the host state, 
in which the investment was made, have concluded bilateral investment treaty on promotion 
and protection of foreign investment. Once the investor from one contracting state to the BIT 
made an investment, that qualifies as an investment under relevant provisions of the BIT, 
his investment is automatically granted a protection under particular provision of the BIT. 
Throughout the evolution of foreign investment protection, the international practice gave rise 
to model structure of the BITs that may vary on a case-by-case basis. Characteristic BITs 
structure is comprised of, among others, definition of an investment and an investor, admission 
of foreign investors, standard of treatment of investors, umbrella clauses, protection 
of investment against expropriation or measure having equivalent effect, compensation 
for damages and dispute resolution clause.59  
Once the host state breaches any protection granted to the qualified investment 
under provisions of the BIT, the investor is entitled to bring a claim against the host state. Thus, 
in order for the BITs investment protection to be sufficiently enforceable, the investor should 
have an option to have his claim authoritatively decided in independent and credible dispute 
resolution forum. Since the foreign investor made an investment in the territory of the host state, 
over which the host state exercises sovereign powers, it is understandable that the protection 
of foreign investment is concerned with potential political pressures imposed on national courts 
when deciding particular investment dispute against the host state.  For these reasons, the BITs 
are essentially similar to bargaining instruments between the home state of the investor 
and the host state, exchanging the advantage of incoming investment flow for consent 
of the host state to refer the potential investment dispute arising out of breach of the BIT 
to neutral arbitration forum.60 Accordingly, the BITs are characteristically provided 
with dispute resolution clauses providing investor with assurance that once the protection 
 
59  SUBEDI, Surya P. (2008). International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing), p. 84. 
BALAŠ, Vladimír, ŠTURMA, Pavel (2018). Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic (Prague: Wolters 
Kluwer ČR), p. 10. 
 
60  SUBEDI, Surya P. (2008). International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing), p. 81. 
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granted to his investment via BIT is breached by the host state, his damaged rights will 
not remain without a remedy. Dispute resolution clauses in the BITs takes various forms 
ranging from setting one arbitration forum to combining several arbitration forums, sometimes 
also in combination with national courts of the host state. One of the most common used 
mechanism of ISDS offered in the BITs is ICSID arbitration forum. Given the unique character 
of ICSID arbitration stemming from its multilateral treaty origin, the ICSID system represents 
very specific sui generis regime based on member states’ accession to the ICSID Convention. 
Therefore, if the contracting states to the BIT wish to offer the investors access to ICSID forum, 
both states need to become the member states of the ICSID Convention. The availability 
of ICSID arbitration proceedings is therefore closely interconnected with conjunction 
of two international treaties, i.e. the ICSID Convention and particular BIT.61  
The ICSID Convention is a multilateral international treaty that lays down the basis 
for currently most commonly chosen dispute settlement forum for international investment 
disputes. Created within the system of the World Bank with aim to promote foreign direct 
investment between developed and developing states, this exclusively procedural international 
treaty significantly brought international arbitration proceedings into international investment 
law and introduced independent arbitration as leading instrument safeguarding the enforcement 
of substantive protection of investment governed by BITs.62 By acceding 
to the ICSID Convention, the signatory member states strengthen their investment protection 
regimes within their territories by introducing an option for foreign investors to have their 
disputes arising out of protected investment resolved by ICSID Tribunal. Each of the member 
state of the ICSID Convention may therefore act either as a home state of the foreign investor, 
or as host state, in which the foreign investor from other member state made his investment. 
However, as any other multilateral international treaty, the ICSID Convention may 
be denounced by the member state at any time and at its sole discretion. It is subject to extensive 
contradictory legal debates, what effects and to what extent does the denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention executed by a host state influences jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Tribunals in emerged investment disputes. Further paragraphs of this chapter will 
provide in-depth analysis of the first research question of this study, i.e. when and under what 
circumstances does the ICSID Tribunal have jurisdiction over the investment dispute if the host 
state denounces the ICSID Convention.  
 
61  Ibid., p. 276. 
 





3.1. Offer and acceptance model in ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings 
 
Prior to analysing the effects of denunciation of the ICSID Convention by the member 
state and how it may influence the jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal, it is crucial to elaborate 
on the mechanism of how the jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal over investment disputes 
is established. The process of conclusion of valid arbitration agreement between host state 
and foreign investor in ICSID arbitration forms the basis for any further elaborations 
on the effects of denunciation process and its implications on ICSID Tribunals’ jurisdiction 
in particular investment cases. 
 
Any investment arbitration is inherently associated with a phenomenon termed 
arbitration without privity63. The foreign investor is not a contracting party to the particular 
BIT, as the BITs are international treaties concluded between the home states of the investors 
and host states, in which the concerned foreign investment is made. Thus, the foreign investor 
and the host state are never in privity, even though the investor is the ultimate beneficiary 
of the BIT and thus possesses significant substantive rights of investment protection. 
In arbitration without privity the procedural rights of the foreign investor are not established 
by ex ante arbitration agreement between the investor and host state, since the foreign investor 
does not have to enter into a contractual relationship with the host state in order to initiate 
the claim against him in arbitral tribunal. The inevitable consequence of admissibility of such 
lack of privity in investment arbitration is the shift of consent to arbitrate from transactional 
level between particular investor and host state into more remote instruments.64  
A consent of both parties to refer an investment dispute arisen between them 
to designated tribunal denotes a fundamental condition that need to be satisfied in any type 
of alternative dispute resolution. Once the latter party to the dispute expresses its consent, 
both consents to arbitrate given by both parties to the investment dispute merge into creation 
of arbitration agreement. The existence of valid arbitration agreement between the host state 
 
63  Term used in PAULSSON, Jan (1995). Arbitration Without Privity. ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 232-257. 
 
64  PAULSSON, Jan (1995). Arbitration Without Privity. ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 2, pp. 232, 256. 
 WAIBEL, Michael (2014). Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility. University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2014, pp. 12-13. 
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and foreign investor is the prerequisite for any arbitral tribunal to have a jurisdiction 
over particular investment dispute. However, given the peculiar triangular relations between 
the states and foreign investor and associated dichotomy between the public and private 
international law aspects of international investment arbitration, the legal theory developed 
special model for analysis of existence of arbitration agreement in investment disputes. 
When assessing whether the consents of both parties were properly given and thus 
the arbitration agreement was implicitly concluded, the so-called offer and acceptance model 
shall be applied. The offer and acceptance model is the traditional instrument of private contract 
law, nevertheless it found its extensive application within the area of international arbitration, 
as any arbitration is inherently regarded as consensual a voluntary form of adjudication.  
Slight difficulties with application of the offer and acceptance model are connected 
with the very nature of foreign direct investment process. As the host state wishes to attract 
and promote foreign investment floats into his territory, by entering into the BIT the host state 
opens the possibility for any foreign investor from other contracting state to conduct investment 
in his territory. The investment relationship between the foreign investor and the host state 
is created at the exact moment, when the foreign investor from another contracting state, 
in compliance with all conditions laid down by the BIT, conduct an investment in the host state. 
Therefore, typically, there is no transactional relationship present between the host state 
and the foreign investor, that would establish the privity of potential investment dispute arisen 
between them.65 The relationship between the foreign investor, as claimant, and the host state, 
as respondent, is established by the virtue of a breach of investment protection 
under the particular BIT provision by the host state, i.e. at the very moment when the dispute 
originates. The inevitable consequence of such discrepancies of investment arbitration 
without privity is that consent to arbitration of the host state and the foreign investor 
will not usually be neither incorporated into one single document, nor given at the same time, 
nor provided in the same form. Therefore, when analysing the proper existence of consent 
on behalf of both parties to the dispute, several aspects and legal instruments need 
to be analysed in their mutual correlation and taking into account throughout complexity 
of the situation.66 
 
65  WAIBEL, Michael (2014). Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility. University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2014, pp. 12-13, 15. 
 
66  SCHREUER, Christoph (2005). Consent to Arbitration (updated 02/2007). Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 5 (www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=555, last accessed on 27 
November 2020), p. 1. 
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A primary construct of the offer and acceptance model in investment arbitration 
is based on the host state providing the offer to arbitrate a dispute before arbitral tribunal 
with investor subsequently accepting such standing offer. As mentioned in the previous 
chapters of this study, there are three variations to the offer and acceptance model dependent 
on the type of the legal instrument, in which the offer to arbitrate is incorporated. The form 
of legal instrument, in which is the offer to arbitrate of the host state incorporated, usually 
corresponds to the legal instrument that provides the substantive investment protection 
in particular case. The first type of legal instrument is a direct agreement concluded 
between the host state and the particular foreign investor regarding his individual investment 
conducted within the territory of the host state. The second type is represented by the national 
legislation enacted by the host state67, which incorporates opened offer of the host state 
to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the breach of national investment legislation before 
designated arbitral tribunal. The opened offer of the host state may be dully accepted 
by any foreign investor whose investment falls within the scope of investment protection 
granted by national legislation. The third type represents the most widely used legal instrument, 
i.e. bilateral investment treaty concluded between the host state and the home state 
of the foreign investor. Within the provisions of the particular BIT the host state provides 
opened offer to arbitrate any dispute arising out of breach of investment treaty in particular 
arbitration forum. Similarly to offer incorporated in national investment legislation, any foreign 
investor eligible for investment protection under the BIT may duly accept opened offer 
of the host state and by this way consequently conclude the arbitration agreement. Both national 
investment legislation and the BITs are legal instruments considered to give rise to arbitration 
without privity. With regard to the limitation of this study, further elaborations in subsequent 
paragraphs of the thesis will be focused on the BITs, as the most commonly chosen mechanism 




67  Most commonly in a form of national investment code.  
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Management, Vol. 5 (www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=555, last accessed on 27 
November 2020), pp. 1-2. 
DOLZER, Rudolf, SCHREUER, Christoph (2008). Principles of International Investment Law (New York: 




3.1.1. The offer of the host state to arbitrate 
 
Focusing on the third type of legal instrument providing foreign investment protection, 
the BIT, it should be noted that the construct of the offer and acceptance model in the BITs 
is very similar to construct of the offer and acceptance model in another type of legal instrument 
capable of providing foreign investment protection, i.e. national investment legislation. 
The most efficient way for the host state to attract foreign investment flows into its territory 
is by concluding the BIT. During the negotiation process of the particular BIT, the host state 
bargain for wording of the BIT provisions, by which it establishes negotiated standard 
of investment protection applicable to any qualified foreign investor from the other contracting 
state. One of the significant safeguards encouraging the foreign investors to conduct investment 
in the host state is the concession of the host state consisting in giving unilateral consent 
to arbitrate any investment dispute arisen from the breach of the BIT provisions in independent 
arbitral tribunal. Providing foreign investment protection via the BITs is an attractive choice 
for the host state also from economic point of view, as one concluded BIT may be applicable 
to hundreds of foreign investors. Therefore, it saves the host state from having to separately 
conclude hundreds of direct agreements with each particular foreign investor that wishes 
to bring his investment into the state’s territory. On the other hand, the absence of any direct 
transactional relationship between particular foreign investor and the host state that would 
otherwise exist in case of concluded direct agreement, must be balanced with certain 
modifications amending the classic contractual offer and acceptance model that is otherwise 
present in clear and unified form.  
The offer of the host state to arbitrate shall be closely connected to substantive 
protection of the investment and thus incorporated in the same legal instrument that provides 
for the investment protection, i.e. in the particular BIT. It is a common practice for the BITs 
to incorporate a dispute resolution clause within its wording. When analysing the wording 
of the particular BIT dispute resolution clause, in majority of cases it may be said that 
the wording contains unequivocal consent of the host state to arbitration. Such unequivocal 
consent may be expressed as “each Contracting Party hereby consents” or “any dispute shall 
be submitted to arbitration”. Nevertheless, not all types of wording in dispute resolution clauses 
are capable of constituting an offer of the host state to arbitrate, but rather represent mere 
promises to give such consent in the future. An example of such rather promising wording 
of arbitration clause may be “a Contracting Party shall consent”. Where the host state merely 
promises to consent to arbitration in the future, it is at complete discretion of the host state 
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to subsequently decide not to give a consent to arbitration in particular case. Such refusal 
of the host state would constitute a breach of provision of the BIT containing the promise 
of the host state to consent to arbitration and thus would be considered as breach of the BIT. 
However, since the host state still did not provide his consent to arbitrate, no offer of the host 
state has been constituted and therefore no arbitration agreement can arise. Once the wording 
of dispute resolution clause in the BIT fulfils the characteristic of unequivocal consent 
of the host state to arbitrate the investment disputes in designated forum, the host state’s offer 
to arbitrate is opened for a due acceptance conducted by any qualified foreign investor.69  
It should be noted that majority of dispute resolution clauses in the BITs neither have 
simple structure nor provide one single dispute resolution forum. Many of dispute resolution 
clauses have complex structure consisting of either cascade or mutually excluding dispute 
settlement fora, inclusion of national courts of the host state or other special procedures set 
by the parties to the BIT, ultimately conditioning and limiting host state’s offer to arbitrate. 
The dispute resolution clauses in the BIT may combine various arbitration fora, 
such as ICSID arbitration, ICC arbitration or arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. 
Depending on the particular wording of the dispute resolution clause, the right to choose 
between designated arbitration fora may be either at sole discretion of the investor or subject 
to expressly prescribed conditions, such as conclusion of additional direct agreement 
between the investor and the host state on selection of the arbitration forum.70  
The offer of the host state incorporated in the particular BIT may be either expressly 
conditioned or limited in the wording of the BIT dispute resolution clause or implicitly 
conditioned or limited by other provisions in the BIT. Such implicit limitation of the offer 
to arbitrate is most commonly induced by some type of prescribed involvement of national 
courts of the host state or possible application of the so-called “most favoured nation clause” 
provision in the BIT. Both of these categories of provisions, including their implicit effects 
on the offer and consent of the host state to arbitrate, will be elaborated in more detail 
in subsequent parts of this study. 
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3.1.1.1. Involvement of national courts 
 
One of the reasons for introducing ISDS mechanisms, including international 
investment arbitration, was intention to prevent national courts of the host state from deciding 
the disputes arising from international investment. The preamble of the ICSID Convention 
indicates reserved approach towards litigations of international investment disputes before 
national courts and admits that even though international investment disputes would usually 
be subject to national legal processes, in certain cases international methods of disputes 
settlement may be appropriate71. Reasons for mostly reserved approach towards national courts 
proceedings of the host state concerning foreign direct investment are general concerns 
about lack of impartiality of the national courts towards the interests of the foreign investor. 
Moreover, national courts are constitutionally obliged to apply domestic law when resolving 
the investment dispute, which may not provide as high standard of investment protection 
as the one granted by the international investment treaty, i.e. by the international law. 
Application of the international law by the national court in particular dispute is largely 
dependent on the constitutional system of the host state, especially with regard to degree 
of monism or dualism tendencies contained in the constitution. Deciding the international 
investment claim before national courts is therefore often connected with disadvantages 
on behalf of the foreign investor, such as large delays, additional expenses and lack 
of foreseeability. On the other hand, the host state may also be burdened with disadvantages 
of litigating an international investment claim, namely the publicity of the domestic 
proceedings that may aggravate the dispute and thus negatively influence the reputation 
of the foreign investment policy of the host state and subsequently lower its attractivity 
for future inflow of foreign investment. Another significant disadvantage that may appear 
on behalf of the host state is concerned with factual effect of domestic decisions, especially 
the ones issued by national courts of higher instance. Such domestic decisions are likely 
to have firmly convincing character and usually trigger consequent unwillingness of the host 
state government to agree on any compromise or abide by decision rendered 
by any international tribunal.72  
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In spite of numerous disadvantages and general animosity connected to involvement 
of national courts of the host state in resolution of international investment disputes, the national 
courts may play greater or lesser role in ISDS mechanism. There are three most commonly used 
types of involvement of national courts in dispute resolution mechanism, the requirement 
of exhaustion of local remedies, the obligation to seek remedy before national courts for stated 
period of time and the so-called “fork in the road” provision. Any such involvement of national 
courts is usually established in dispute resolution clause of the particular BIT. The extent 
of involvement of national courts in resolving investment disputes depends on specific wording 
of the particular BIT. In cases of ICSID arbitration proceedings particularly, 
any such prescribed involvement of national courts modifies and potentially limits the offer 
of the host state to arbitrate. The investor must comply with such additionally imposed 
obligations connected with the offer of the host state to arbitrate in order to be entitled to duly 
accept such modified offer and subsequently access the ICSID arbitration forum. 
 
One of the most common practices concerning involvement of national courts 
of the host state is the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. Once the BIT imposes 
obligation on an investor to firstly exhaust all possible remedies before national courts 
of the host state, an investor is obliged to do so before it can submit the claim to designated 
arbitration forum. In such case, the opened offer of the host state to arbitrate is conditioned 
by exhaustion of local remedies by the investor. Prior to such exhaustion, the consent of the host 
state to arbitration is not given. The origin of requirement of exhaustion of local remedies 
in investment arbitration is closely connected to traditional principle of public international law, 
according to which the investor, intending to submit its international claim to international 
proceedings, must firstly exhaust the domestic remedies available in the national court system 
of the host state. Nevertheless, this traditional principle of public international law is no longer 
applicable in the area of investment arbitrations, as a valid consent of the host state to arbitrate 
provided in the BIT provisions overrides any such requirement.73 This approach is nowadays 
stated in art. 26 of the ICSID Convention allowing the contracting states to the convention 
to make their consent to arbitrate conditional upon exhaustion of domestic judicial 
or administrative remedies. Art. 26 of the ICSID Convention has been interpreted 
 




by the ICSID Tribunals in cases Amco v. Indonesia74 and Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine75, 
where the Tribunals confirmed that once the contracting state to the ICSID Convention have 
not conditioned its consent to ICSID arbitration by prior exhaustion of local remedies, 
such condition is deemed to have been waived and thus cannot be subsequently invoked 
by the host state. If the state wishes to compel the investor to exhaust local remedies prior 
to institution of ICSID arbitration proceedings, such condition must be incorporated 
into provisions of the particular BIT, and so a priori limit the otherwise opened offer 
to arbitrate.76 It should be noted that ICSID Tribunals are not the only arbitration Tribunals 
that deny the existence of general obligation of the investor to firstly exhausted all available 
local remedies available in the host state before going to international arbitration forum. In case 
Nykomb v. Latvia77 concerned with foreign investment under Energy Charter Treaty78, 
the SCC Tribunal ruled that there is no general obligation imposed by the international law 
or Energy Charter Treaty to exhaust local remedies unless the host state stipulated 
such obligation in its offer to arbitrate.79 Therefore, if the host state wishes to condition 
its consent to arbitrate by exhaustion of local remedies, the host state 
together with the home state must explicitly incorporate such condition into provisions 
of the BIT or other applicable international investment agreement. 
 
Lighter alternative to requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is condition to seek 
remedy before national courts for stated period of time before accessing the arbitration forum. 
This condition obliges an investor to firstly initiate the claim before national courts and seek 
redress for a prescribed period of time, usually of eighteen months. If the national court 
have not rendered any decision on the merits within prescribed period of time, or even if some 
decision on the merits have been rendered, but despite the rendered decision the investment 
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dispute between the investor and host state still persists80, the investor is entitled to submit 
the dispute to prescribed arbitration forum. Therefore, the offer of the host state to arbitrate 
is suspended for stated period of time designated for national courts proceedings and opens 
itself for acceptance after expiration of such period.81 
 
Another commonly used provision in the BITs related to involvement of national 
courts of the host state in investment disputes settlement is so-called “fork in the road” 
provision. The previously elaborated requirement was based on obligation of the investor 
to seek remedy before national courts for the prescribed period of time. In such case the investor 
is forced to bring the investment claim to both national courts and international arbitration 
tribunal. The “fork in the road” requirement, however, has completely opposite effect.82 
The “fork in the road” provision entitles the foreign investor to choose particular judicial forum 
for litigation of his investment claim. Most typically, the selection is made between the national 
courts of the host state and designated international arbitration forum. The “fork in the road” 
provision put an obligation on the foreign investor to select the judicial forum 
in which his investment claim will be resolved. Once the investor makes a selection, the choice 
of the forum is considered to be final and cannot be revoked. If the investor chooses to litigate 
its investment claim in domestic courts of the host state, the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal 
over the identical dispute is excluded, and vice versa.83  
In Lauder v Czech Republic84 the ICSID Tribunal described purpose 
of the “fork in the road” provision as a tool aimed to prevent one identical investment dispute 
between identical parties from being litigated both in national courts and international arbitral 
tribunals.85 One of the principal issues to be considered in connection with “fork in the road” 
provision is the definition of the identical dispute that should be prevented from multiple 
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proceedings. The practice of arbitral tribunals in evaluation of identity of the investment 
disputes is not unified and the tribunals tend to apply different distinguishing criteria.  
Some of the arbitral tribunals have considered investment disputes as identical, 
if the claims were based on a legal obligation of the same nature, i.e. claims stipulating the same 
cause of action.86 Practical disadvantage of such distinguishing criterion lies within the nature 
and complexity of the investment disputes. The investment disputes are by their very nature 
usually composed of multiple legal obligations that are different in nature, but altogether 
comprising complex investment relationship. It is common for a foreign investor to find himself 
in a position, where his investment rights protected by the BIT were breached by the conduct 
of a host state, however such conduct of state may result in multiple breach of legal obligations. 
Such discrepancy may arise in situations, where the investor files the claim against the host 
state in national court for damages based on a breach of national law and subsequently files 
the expropriation claim in international arbitral tribunal for breach of investment protection 
granted by the particular BIT. In such case both claims of the investor are not stipulating 
the same cause of action, as one references to breach of national law and other references 
to breach of the BIT. Nevertheless, within both of these breaches the investor may claim same 
damages incurred from single conduct of a host state.87  
Taking into account described discrepancy, some of the arbitral tribunals resort 
to another criterion when assessing the identity of the investment claims, that is a fundamental 
basis of the claim.88 In elaboration of the fundamental basis of the claim, the tribunal must 
comprehensively look at the investment dispute, its origin and complexity. Within 
such elaboration it is unlikely for the tribunal to overlook that claimed breaches of multiple 
legal obligations may just be reflections of one single conduct of the host state. Similarly, 
if two claims invoke similar reliefs based on one single legal obligation contained in BIT, 
it cannot be automatically concluded that the disputes are identical.89 With regard to described 
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features of the investment claims it may be concluded that the “fork in the road” provisions 
in the BITs are particularly designed to limit the foreign investors in filing multiple investment 
claims with same fundamental basis in both national courts of the host state and international 
arbitration tribunal. The “fork in the road” provisions are significantly relevant in the BITs that 
entitle the investor to initiate broad spectrum of investment disputes originated in either national 
law of the host state or BIT. Hence, such investment disputes may potentially fall 
under the jurisdiction of both national courts and international tribunal and thus give rise to very 
high risk of competing parallel jurisdictions.90 
With regard to the assessment of the “fork in the road” regime and its impact 
on the offer of the host state to arbitrate, it may be concluded that the “fork in the road” 
provision contained in particular BIT serves as condition precedent to the offer of the host state 
to arbitrate the investment dispute in an arbitration forum. Therefore, this kind of condition 
precedent is considered satisfied upon the selection of arbitration forum made by the eligible 
investor.91 
 
3.1.1.2. Most favoured nation clauses 
 
The continuous evolvement process of foreign direct investment protection is 
accompanied by the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investors from different states. 
However, the process of negotiation and conclusion of the BIT may result in various wordings, 
and thus it is likely for each particular BIT to contain different set of provisions. Consequently, 
it is very common for the host state to conclude distinct BITs with different investment 
protection standards with another contracting states. Therefore, the protection of foreign direct 
investments made in the territory of the host state varies depending on the level of investment 
protection standard granted by each particular BIT. As a result, the foreign investors domiciled 
or incorporated in different home states that are eligible for protection of their investments may 
not be granted the same level of protection within the territory of the host state. 
Such discriminatory effect categorising foreign investors in one single host state into groups 
with distinct standards of protection is in international investment law generally undesirable.  
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In order to prevent described discriminatory effects of different BITs wordings 
providing distinct standards of investment protection within territory of one single host state, 
the practice introduced the so-called “most favoured nation clause” provision. The most 
favoured nation clause is regarded as traditional instrument aimed to balance discriminatory 
effects and safeguard equal standard of protection for foreign investors who conducted 
their investments in territory of one single host state.92 Once the most favoured nation clause 
is incorporated into the wording of the BIT, the foreign investor eligible for investment 
protection under the particular BIT shall be entitled to invoke the same standard of investment 
protection available to any other foreign investor under any other BIT concluded with the host 
state. The most favoured nation clause is thus able to transfer higher standard of investment 
protection from another BIT concluded between the host state and any other contracting state 
other than the home state of the investor. The investor is subsequently enabled to invoke higher 
standard of protection for his investment than the protection granted to him by his BIT.93  
With regard to the application scope of the most favoured nation clauses, 
some of the BITs contains most favourite nation clause that by itself limits its scope 
of application. The limitations are usually formulated as description of parts of the particular 
BITs to which the most favoured nation clause is applicable, or which are excluded 
from its application. However, majority of the most favoured national clauses do not contain 
any limitation nor suggestion on which aspects of the investment shall fall under the scope 
of the clause. Originally, the most favoured nation clauses were aimed at extension 
of only substantive protection of investment. In contrast, the dispute resolution clauses 
established in the BIT tended to be considered as separate provisions that incorporate 
the consent to arbitration together with its conditions and limitations into the particular BIT. 
Given such peculiar independent character of dispute resolution clauses, the practice had 
negative approach towards legality of application of the most favoured nation clause to dispute 
resolution mechanism established in the BITs. Nevertheless, with evolvement of applicability 
of most favoured nation clauses in international investment disputes, further discussions 
evolved whether the general scope of application of most favoured nation clause should not 
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be extended also to procedural investment protection, i.e. to dispute resolution mechanisms 
incorporated in BITs.94 
The discussions about extension of most favoured nation clause to procedural 
protection of investment were significantly elaborated in controversial decision of arbitral 
tribunal Maffezini v Spain95. In Maffezini v Spain, the investment dispute arisen between 
the Argentinian investor and Kingdom of Spain, concerning production of chemical products 
in territory of Spain. Investment of Argentinian investor was protected by the BIT concluded 
between Argentina and Spain, which contained provision conditioning the offer to arbitrate 
by imposing legal obligation on any eligible foreign investor to firstly initiate and proceed 
with the investment dispute in national courts of Spain for period of eighteen months 
before filing the claim in international arbitration tribunal. Alongside with this conditioned 
offer to arbitrate, the BIT between Argentina and Spain contained also the most favoured nation 
clause. The most favoured nation clause extended the investment treatment to any treatment 
granted to foreign investors within territory of Spain by any BIT concluded with a third country. 
According to the wording of the clause, such extended treatment shall have covered all matters 
subject to the BIT. By the virtue of this clause, the Argentinian investor invoked the dispute 
resolution mechanism incorporated in the BIT between Chile and Spain, in which the offer 
to arbitrate was not conditioned by compulsory litigation of investment dispute in national 
courts for the period of eighteen months. The arbitral tribunal allowed application of the most 
favoured nation clause to dispute settlement provision, confirmed that the Argentinian investor 
had right to initiate the investment dispute directly in international arbitration forum 
and therefore could have accepted Spanish offer to arbitrate in its unconditioned form 
incorporated in the BIT between Chile and Spain.96 The arbitral tribunal reasoned its conclusion 
based on comparison of protection of investors under investment treaties to protection of traders 
under commercial treaties. The rights of traders under international commercial treaties 
were initially protected by consular jurisdiction and subsequently by any other form 
of jurisdiction having extraterritorial basis. The extraterritorial nature of protection 
in commercial treaties was deemed fundamental for protection of rights of the traders stemming 
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from the treaty and despite not being part of any material aspect of the trade, the dispute 
settlement mechanism significantly advanced the level of protection granted to foreign traders. 
Analogically, the dispute resolution mechanisms, as modern forms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, incorporated in international investment treaties represent essential tool in securing 
sufficient protection of foreign investors and thus shall be considered as inseparably 
connected to material aspects of investment treatment.97  
Alongside with surprising decision of the arbitral tribunal that significantly extended 
the scope of application of the most favoured nation clause on procedural aspects of investment 
protection, the arbitral tribunal further analysed application of the clause in other scenarios. 
In this way the arbitral tribunal limited potentially large effects of his decision on subsequent 
cases. In general, the arbitral tribunal in Maffezini v Spain excluded application 
of most favoured nation clause on situations, where invoking of the clause by the foreign 
investor would contradict the public policy of the host state. Such public policy considerations 
shall arise from process of conclusion of the particular BIT, during which the contracting parties 
have anticipated such considerations to be essential for their acceptance of the BIT.98 
The arbitral tribunal provided examples of such situations, in which the public policy 
considerations are deemed to override the right of foreign investor to rely on dispute settlement 
mechanism incorporated in other BIT via most favoured nation clause. First two examples 
are requirement of exhaustion of local remedies and the so-called “fork in the road” provision, 
which both have been elaborated in previous parts of this study. As third and fourth example 
provided by the arbitral tribunal are situations, where the BIT refers to some concrete arbitration 
forum, e.g. ICSID, or where the contracting parties agreed on highly institutionalised system 
of arbitration with specific procedural rules. The last two examples cannot be overridden 
by the most favoured nation clause as they both represent very concrete expression of the will 
of the contracting parties to the BIT. The arbitral tribunal further complements 
the non-exhaustive list of examples with general guidance for any upcoming assessment, 
by stating that in every case the elaboration shall be conducted in order to find proper balance 
between the right of the foreign investor to legitimately extend his investment protection 
via most favoured nation clause and risk of undesirable treaty-shopping that would contravene 
the policy objectives of the particular BIT provisions.99 
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Some of the arbitral tribunals followed the reasoning of Maffezini v Spain and allowed 
the foreign investor to override the obligation to litigate the investment dispute in national 
courts of the host state for prescribed period of time. In Siemens v Argentina100 the arbitral 
tribunal permitted the extensive application of the most favoured nation clause to procedural 
protection of investment by examining the dispute resolution clauses contained in similar BITs 
that were concluded by the host state at around the same time as the invoked BITs. The host 
state concluded three different BITs in the same year, where all of the BITs were inconsistent 
regarding the existence of obligation of the investor to litigate the dispute in national courts 
prior to institution of arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal concluded that once such 
inconsistency occurs, the condition to submit investment dispute to national courts 
for prescribed period of time cannot be regarded as matter of public policy of the host state 
and fundamental element of consent of the host state to arbitration.101  
Nevertheless, some of the arbitral tribunals set further limitations on scope 
of application of the most favoured nation clause in situations, where the foreign investor aimed 
to extend the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals. In case Plama v Bulgaria102 the particular 
BITs did not provide for arbitration between the host state and investor, therefore the foreign 
investor tried to incorporate the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal from other BIT 
into his investment dispute via most favoured nation clause. Since Bulgaria did not give 
any consent to ICSID arbitration in the particular BIT, no offer of the host state to arbitrate 
the investment disputes was incorporated in the BIT. The arbitral tribunal ruled that it is 
not within the abilities of the most favoured nation clause to establish ICSID jurisdiction, as it 
cannot transfer the otherwise not existing consent to arbitrate of the host state from one BIT 
to another. Moreover, the arbitral tribunal stated that the most favoured nation clause is 
not able to incorporate by reference any dispute resolution clause or its part from another BIT 
if the contracting parties to the former BIT did not intend to incorporate such provision 
via most favoured nation clause.103 Another example of decision where arbitral tribunal 
declined the application of most favoured nation clause with regard to procedural protection 
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of investment was Telenor v Hungary104. In Telenor v Hungary the foreign investor sought 
to extend the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to claims based not only on expropriation. 
The arbitral tribunal held that allowing the most favoured nation clause to substantially extend 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in such way would result in treaty-shopping of the foreign 
investors. Moreover, as the contracting parties to the former BIT intentionally limited the scope 
of jurisdiction to expropriation, any extension of jurisdiction via most favoured nation clause 
would contravene the common intentions expressed by the parties when concluding the BIT.105 
In conclusion, the offer of the host state to arbitrate incorporated in the BIT 
may be significantly influenced by the most favoured nation clause contained in the particular 
BIT. Following the established practice of arbitral tribunals, the most favoured nation clause, 
if sufficiently broadly formulated, may override the condition to litigate the investment dispute 
in national courts for the prescribed period of time and thus transform the otherwise conditioned 
offer to arbitrate into unconditional offer of the host state. Surprisingly, other forms 
of involvement of national courts in dispute resolution mechanism, such as requirement 
of exhaustion of local remedies or the so-called “fork in the road” provision, were considered 
as matters of public policy of the host state and therefore prevented from overriding effect 
of the most favoured nation clause. It may be argued that once the host state expressly 
conditions its offer to arbitrate in the particular BIT by imposing an obligation to firstly submit 
the dispute to national courts, it is possible that such condition may be implied from specific 
policy of the host state towards the other contracting state. It is doubtful whether such condition 
does not represent for the host state the essential requirement of its consent to arbitration 
or contradicts the intention of the host state present at the time of conclusion of the particular 
BIT. Moreover, since the international investment arbitration is based on consensus 
of the parties to arbitrate, it is debatable, once the host state conditions its offer to arbitrate, 
whether the simple transfer of different offer from the other BIT concluded by the host state, 
unconditioned and made towards another contracting state in line with other policy 
considerations, could be in line with interest of the host state. The arbitral tribunals set out clear 
limitations on overriding ability of the most favoured nation clause, especially in connection 
with establishing the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal that otherwise would not exist. Any other 
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conclusion would result in disruptive application of the most favoured nation clause, 
as the clause would be able to establish a consent of the host state to arbitrate that has 
never been given and thus compel the state to subordinate to jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. 
 
The offer of the host state to arbitrate incorporated in the particular BIT 
may be comprised of complex structure involving various requirements and conditions. 
In general, any foreign investor that aims to have his investment dispute resolved in designated 
arbitration forum, must comply with the structure, requirements and conditions stipulated 
of the offer of the host state to arbitrate, otherwise the offer is not opened for acceptance 
and thus the consent of the host state to arbitration is not given. The particular attention 
should be brought to the BIT provisions involving national courts of the host state 
into the dispute resolution mechanism implemented in the particular BIT. Some type 
of involvements of national courts, such as requirement of exhaustion of local remedies 
or obligation to litigate the investment dispute in national courts for prescribed period of time, 
are capable of suspending the offer of the host state to arbitrate and act like conditions 
precedents. Moreover, non-compliance with such conditions by foreign investor will result 
in blocking of the offer of the host state and inherent absence of consent of the host state 
to arbitration. The third type of involvement of national courts taking the form of the so-called 
“fork in the road provision” renders the offer of the host state conditional upon the choice 
of the foreign investor. Once the foreign investor chooses the national courts of the host state, 
the offer of the host state together with the consent to arbitrate is no longer given. 
With regard to evolving discussions on applicability of the so-called 
“most favoured nation clause” provisions to procedural protection of investment, the existence 
of such clause in the particular BIT may override some conditions or requirements of the offer 
and thus ultimately transfer the consent of the host state from another BIT to the concerned 
investment dispute. The arbitral tribunals have so far permitted the most favoured nation clause 
to override the requirement to litigate the investment dispute in national courts for prescribed 
period of time, whereas in cases of exhaustion of local remedies and so-called “fork in the road” 
provisions the application of the clause was denied as both requirements are considered to fall 
within the public policy of the host state. However, with regard to the indispensably consensual 
nature of investment arbitration, as one of the methods of alternative dispute resolution, it is 
still questionable whether such transfer of consent originally granted in another BIT 




3.1.2. Acceptance of the offer of the host state to arbitrate by the investor 
 
With regard to voluntary and consensual nature of dispute resolution mechanisms, 
the corner stone and fundamental condition of any investment arbitration proceedings 
is existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties to arbitration. The arbitration 
agreement is created by meeting of consents of both parties to the dispute to arbitrate 
the particular investment dispute in designated arbitration forum. Since in case of foreign direct 
investment the international investment agreements are concluded between home states 
of the foreign investors and host states, within which territory is the foreign investment made, 
the subsequently emerged investment dispute between the host state and the foreign investor is 
inevitably concerned with a phenomenon termed arbitration without privity. The practical 
consequence of arbitration without privity is the situation, where the foreign investor, as a party 
to the investment dispute and ultimate beneficiary of the BIT, must provide its consent 
to arbitration. In order to reflect such specific feature of investment arbitration, the legal theory 
developed special tool for assessment of existence of perfected arbitration agreement between 
the parties, i.e. the offer and acceptance model. As elaborated in the previous parts of this study, 
the host state provides its consent to arbitration in offer to arbitrate incorporated in the particular 
BIT. Therefore, in order to constitute perfected arbitration agreement between the parties 
to the dispute, the foreign investor, eligible under provisions of the particular BIT, must provide 
its consent to arbitration by acceptation of such offer. Acceptance of valid opened offer 
to arbitrate by eligible foreign investor prefects the arbitration agreement between the foreign 
investor and the host state. Such newly created arbitration agreement between the parties 
to the investment dispute remains effective and represents legal basis for subsequent conduct 
of the arbitration proceedings.106  
 
Similarly to classic offer and acceptance model used in private contract law 
within national legal systems, the acceptance in international investment arbitration must have 
specific features in order to have ability to complement the offer and thus perfect the arbitration 
agreement. In general, the acceptance shall be a reflection of the particular offer 
and be compatible with the structure and requirements set by the offer to arbitrate. 
The acceptance of the offer to arbitrate may take either the expressed or implied form. 
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Within the firstly stated form of acceptance, the express acceptation, the conduct of the foreign 
investor consists in providing explicit statement, in which the investor consents to arbitration. 
Even though it is at the sole discretion of the foreign investor whether to accept the offer 
of the host state and thus provide consent to arbitration, there are couple of model situations, 
in which the foreign investor is induced to submit his consent at quite early stage 
of his investment activities, prior to commencement of any investment dispute. Some 
of the BITs by themselves contain provision that imposes obligation on the foreign investor 
to submit his consent to arbitration and thus explicitly accept the offer of the host state 
to arbitrate incorporated in the same BIT. Moreover, the BIT may also particularly state 
that any benefits stemming from the BIT will only be applicable to foreign investors 
who submitted their express consent to arbitration. Once the foreign investor accepts the offer, 
the arbitration agreement is considered as perfected, and both the host state and the foreign 
investor are entitled to initiate the arbitration proceedings in prescribed arbitration forum 
at any time following the acceptation. Not only the BITs themselves, but also the host states 
may induce the foreign investors to accept the offer to arbitrate. The host states usually persuade 
the foreign investor to provide explicit consent to arbitration at the initial stage 
of the investment. Most commonly the host states use obligation to submit the express consent 
of the foreign investor to arbitration as requirement for admitting the foreign direct investment 
into their territory or as condition for granting a licence necessary for the investor to conduct 
his business within their territory.107 However pressuring on the foreign investor the described 
situations may seem, it should be noted that the mechanism of dispute settlement in the form 
of investment arbitration is primarily designed to protect the foreign investors from unjust 
treatment of their investment. In conclusion, requirement or obligation of the foreign investor 
to a priori submit his explicit consent to arbitration and thus early accept the offer to arbitrate 
may be considered as rather advantageous for the foreign investor, since the arbitration 
agreement commence to exist from an early stage of his investment activities.  
Unless the particular BIT obliges the foreign investor to expressly submit the consent 
to arbitration to the host state, the offer of the host state to arbitrate may also be accepted 
by the foreign investor in implied way. In such case, the consent of the investor to arbitration 
will be inferred from the conduct of a foreign investor. The most commonly occurring form 
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of implied consent to arbitration is initiation of arbitration proceedings in arbitration forum 
designated to resolve the investment dispute. Even though the conduct of the foreign investor 
by which he consents to arbitration is not addressed to the other party of the arbitration 
proceedings, i.e. the host state, but rather to designated arbitration forum, the consent 
of the foreign investor is deemed to be lawfully provided and the arbitration agreement between 
the parties to arbitration is considered to be established. The permissibility to implicate 
the consent to arbitration from institution of arbitration proceedings by the foreign investor is 
closely connected with the nature of investment arbitration being termed as the arbitration 
without privity. The established practice of the arbitral tribunals allowing the arbitration 
agreement between the parties to the investment dispute being perfected by institution 
of arbitration proceedings by the foreign investor was most significantly affirmed 
in case Generation Ukraine v Ukraine108.109 In Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, the BIT 
concluded between Ukraine and the United States designated ICSID as forum for arbitration 
proceedings and did not contain any provision requiring the foreign investor to address 
his explicit consent to arbitration directly to the host state. The foreign investor from the United 
States without any prior submission of his consent to arbitration to Ukraine filed the Notice 
of Arbitration at the ICSID. The arbitral tribunal held that by filing the Notice of Arbitration 
at the ICSID the investor validly consented to the ICSID arbitration proceedings. 
With reference to well established decision-making practice the arbitral tribunal confirmed 
the right of any foreign investor to accept the offer of the host state incorporated in the BIT 
and providing for ICSID arbitration forum via instituting ICSID arbitration proceedings.110  
 
The acceptance of the offer to arbitrate may be indirectly influenced by the two 
mutually interconnected institutes that are commonly incorporated in the BITs that may affect 
the acceptance of the offer to arbitrate by the foreign investor. The first institute capable 
of having effect on the acceptance of the offer to arbitrate is the provision in the particular BIT 
imposing obligation on the foreign investor to submit a notice of intent to arbitrate 
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arisen investment claim in designated arbitration forum. Another institute, most frequently used 
in combination with the notice of intent is a provision of the particular BIT establishing 
the so-called “cooling-off period” that obligates the foreign investor to negotiate 
the arisen investment dispute for prescribed period of time prior to institution of arbitration 
proceedings. Both institutes will be jointly elaborated in subsequent section of the study.  
 
3.1.2.1. Notice of intent and cooling-off periods 
 
One of the standardised types of requirements contained in the vast majority 
of the BITs is the so-called “cooling-off period”. The cooling-off periods imposes an obligation 
on the foreign investor to endeavour to amicably settle the investment dispute 
before the institution of the arbitration proceedings. Such amicable settling is likely to have 
a form of negotiations or consultations for prescribed period of time. The particular provisions 
in the BIT establishing the cooling-off periods usually set the time frame for compulsory 
negotiation phase in a range between three months and twelve months. Once the prescribed 
period of time elapses and the parties have taken steps to amicably settle the investment dispute 
without successfully reaching the settlement, the foreign investor is entitled to initiate 
the arbitration proceedings in conformity with applicable provisions of the BIT.111 The frequent 
incorporation of the cooling-off provisions into the BITs is connected with the general purpose 
to let some period of time elapse between the factual circumstances that triggered 
the investment dispute and submission of the investment dispute to arbitration proceedings. 
The cooling-off period is designed to induce the host state and the foreign investor to attempt 
to amicably settle the investment dispute and thus avoid submission of the dispute to arbitration 
proceedings.112  
Another institute closely connected to the cooling-off period is the notice of intent, 
synonymously called “a trigger letter”. The notice of intent is a submission of the foreign 
investor addressed to the host state, by which the foreign investor informs the host state 
on the existence of the investment dispute and the intention to institute the arbitration 
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proceedings in accordance with applicable provisions of the BIT. In most of the cases 
the notice of intent serves as the submission triggering the commencement 
of the cooling-off period incorporated in the same BIT. It is not a common practice for the BITs 
to stipulate the content requirements of particular notice of dispute. However, 
with regard to the purpose a function of the institute, it may be deduced that 
the notice of dispute should state adequate amount of information on the identity of the foreign 
investor, the investment conducted under the BIT, the factual and legal basis of the dispute 
and indication that the obligations under the BIT have been breached.113  
As both cooling-off periods and notices of intent have a form of legal obligation 
imposed on the eligible foreign investor by particular provisions of the BIT and represents 
institutes closely connected to the procedural and jurisdictional aspects of the dispute resolution 
mechanism incorporated in the particular BIT, it is questionable what kind of impact 
would have non-compliance of the foreign investor with such obligations. The issue 
to be considered within this elaboration is the nature of the requirements imposed on the foreign 
investor, i.e. whether the requirements shall be considered as jurisdictional or procedural. 
Jurisdictional nature of the requirements would lead to conclusion that non-compliance 
with these requirements by the foreign investor would lead to declining of the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal in subsequent arbitration proceedings. In contrast, the mere procedural 
character of the requirements would not lead to exclusion of the jurisdiction, but rather 
to suspension of the proceedings.114 The approaches of arbitral tribunals towards the legal 
effects of non-compliance with cooling-off periods and notices of intent has not been united.  
In majority of the cases, where the foreign investor initiated the arbitration proceedings 
significantly earlier before the expiration of the cooling-off period provided in the particular 
BIT, the arbitral tribunals held that the requirement of attempting to amicably settle the dispute 
between the parties for prescribed period of time is not of a jurisdictional nature and thus its 
non-satisfaction cannot deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction over particular dispute. 
In Lauder v Czech Republic115 the BIT between the United States and the Czech Republic 
provided cooling-off period of six months and the investor from the United States instituted 
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the arbitration proceedings seventeen days after the commencement of the cooling-off period. 
Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal held that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal cannot 
be derogated by six months long cooling-off period, as the requirement has rather procedural 
character. The reasoning of the tribunal was based on the assumption that the negotiations 
would not result in any amicable settlement and declining of jurisdiction of the tribunal 
in order to induce the parties to negotiate would represent an excessive formalistic approach 
not protecting any legitimate interests of the parties to the dispute.116 Similar approach 
was followed by the arbitral tribunal in SGS v Pakistan117, in which the BIT concluded 
between Switzerland and Pakistan established cooling-off period of twelve months. The Swiss 
investor initiated the ICSID arbitration proceedings two days after the commencement 
of the cooling-off period. The arbitral tribunal refused jurisdictional implications 
of non-compliance with the cooling-off period and affirmed the jurisdiction over the dispute. 
The arbitral tribunal also based his conclusion on probable unsuccessfulness of the negotiations 
and additionally pointed out that insisting on such procedural requirement would be highly 
cost-effective as the foreign investor would be forced to re-submit his claim to arbitral tribunal. 
The arbitral tribunal clearly stated that the requirement of cooling-off period cannot amount 
to condition precedent for establishment of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.118 Another 
practical reason supporting the procedural character of the requirement to comply 
with the cooling-off period was stated by the arbitral tribunal in Wena Hotels v Egypt119. 
In Wena Hotels v Egypt the BIT between United Kingdom and Egypt provided for three months 
long cooling-off period that was not complied with on behalf of the investor from the United 
Kingdom. The Egypt subsequently withdrew his jurisdictional objection 
based on non-compliance of the investor with the cooling-off requirement. The arbitral tribunal 
commented on the withdrawal stating that if the jurisdictional objection was granted, it would 
only interrupt the arbitration proceedings and most likely not have any other practical effects. 
Moreover, the tribunal noted that affirming the jurisdictional effect of the cooling-off period 
would merely result in re-institution of the arbitral proceedings, as the three months 
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cooling-off period would elapse even before the arbitral tribunal would render its decision 
on jurisdiction.120  
In contrast with the majority of arbitral tribunals that ruled in favour of the sole 
procedural effects of the cooling-off periods, some of the arbitral tribunals assigned at least 
some procedural responsibility to the foreign investor for his non-compliance or even attributed 
the cooling-off periods the jurisdictional affects in contradiction to majority of decisions. 
In Ethyl v Canada121 the NAFTA provided for the cooling-off period of six months 
commencing at the moment of occurrence of the events that give rise to the dispute. The foreign 
investor initiated the arbitration proceedings against Canada five days after the commencement 
of the cooling-off period. The arbitral tribunal affirmed his jurisdiction over the dispute 
and excluded the jurisdictional effects of non-compliance with the cooling-off period reasoning 
that the negotiations are likely to be unsuccessful and there is no purpose in suspending the right 
of the investor to proceed with the claim. However, the arbitral tribunal noted that the investor 
by non-compliance with the requirement to negotiate prior to filing the Notice of Arbitration 
conducted gun-jumping and thus forced the tribunal to rule on jurisdictional aspects 
of the dispute. For these reasons the arbitral tribunal imposed obligation on the foreign investor 
to bear the costs of the proceedings for the part of proceedings dealing with jurisdictional 
issues.122  
The minority view supporting the jurisdictional effects of the cooling-off periods were 
held by arbitral tribunals in cases Goetz v Burundi123, Enron v Argentina124 
and Guaracachi v Bolivia125. Even though both of these tribunals attributed 
the cooling-off periods the ability to deprive the tribunal of the jurisdiction over the dispute, 
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the reasoning and factual context of both cases were significantly different. In Goetz v Burundi 
the BIT concluded between Belgium and Burundi provided very peculiarly and detailed 
wording of the cooling-off period. Firstly, the BIT specifically stated the requirements 
on content of the notice of intent that should have been submitted to the host state 
together with memorandum sufficiently in detail describing the situation. The provision 
further established three months long cooling-off period during which the foreign investor 
and the host state should undertook steps towards amicable settlement. If not successful, 
the provision instructed the contracting parties to the BIT, i.e. the host state and the home state 
of the investor, to conduct diplomatic negotiations. Given the very uncommon requirement 
of diplomatic negotiations that require the negotiation procedures between two states, not being 
the parties to the investment dispute, the arbitral tribunal declined its jurisdiction 
over the supplementary claim, attributing to such specifically worded cooling-off period 
jurisdictional effect.126 On the other hand, in Enron v Argentina, the BIT between the United 
States and Argentina established six months long cooling-off period. The investor 
from the United States complied with the cooling-off period and the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
has been confirmed, nevertheless the arbitral tribunal seized the opportunity to present his 
opposing view on the nature of the cooling-off period requirement in its obiter dictum. 
The arbitral tribunal stated that non-compliance with the requirement of the cooling-off period 
shall be assessed as jurisdictional obstacle depriving the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction 
over the investment dispute.127 Similar conclusion was followed by the arbitral tribunal 
in Guaracachi v Bolivia, the investment dispute based on the BITs between the United 
Kingdom and Bolivia and the United States and Bolivia. The BIT between the United Kingdom 
and Bolivia contained the cooling-off period of six months commencing on the date 
of submission of the notice of intent to arbitrate the alleged investment dispute. The arbitral 
tribunal adopted a firm stance towards the nature of obligation to comply with the cooling-off 
period and ruled that even though the six months negotiations are unlikely to lead towards 
any amicable settlement between the parties, the foreign investor is not entitled to deliberately 
omit his compliance with such obligation. The arbitral tribunal pointed out, that the cooling-off 
period obliges the foreign investor as to the means and not the result, i.e. the investor is 
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not obliged to reach an amicable settlement within the waiting period, but rather obliged to give 
a chance to the other party to negotiate. Any anticipated unsuccessfulness of the negotiations 
cannot override the obligation of the investor to comply with the cooling-off period. Moreover, 
the arbitral tribunal step even further in the assessment of the jurisdictional effects of 
the cooling-off period and concluded that non-compliance with such obligation constitutes 
jurisdictional obstacle as it disrupts the jurisdiction ratione voluntatis. The offer of the host 
state to arbitrate incorporated in the BIT is subject to all provisions contained in the BIT, 
including the cooling-off period, and the foreign investor must accept such offer in its entirety 
and comply with all requirements set by the BIT, otherwise the consent of the host state 
to arbitrate is not given. The tribunal concluded that the foreign investor is not entitled to decide 
which of the BIT provision is he going to comply with, and which is he going to omit, 
as the foreign investor is not entitled to unilaterally amend neither the offer of the host state 
to arbitrate nor the wording of particular provisions incorporated in the BIT.128 
 
Very frequent occurrence of the cooling-off periods in the BITs accents the general 
intention of the parties to preferably amicably settle the arisen investment dispute. However, 
the decision-making practice has not been unified as to the nature of the obligation to seek 
an amicable settlement for prescribed period of time. Even though the vast majority 
of the tribunals concluded that such obligation can merely have procedural effect and thus can 
be remedied by subsequent conduct of the investor, allowing the foreign investors 
to deliberately omit the obligation imposed on them by the BIT should not stay without 
any consequences and should be punished at least by partial attribution of costs 
of proceedings.129 However probable the unsuccessfulness and futility of the negotiations may 
seem, such argument should not be sufficient to override the application of the cooling-off 
period as such. The purpose of the cooling-off period is to provide reasonable amount of time 
for the host state and the foreign investor to take steps towards amicable settlement 
of the dispute without any pressure stemming from initiated arbitration proceedings. 
According to some decisions of arbitral tribunals, the non-compliance with the cooling-off 
period on behalf of the foreign investor may have significant jurisdictional effects, 
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including incomplete acceptance of the offer to arbitrate incorporated in the particular BIT. 
Inconsistent rulings of various arbitral tribunals suggest that the cooling-off period may 
represent a jurisdictional requirement incorporated in the offer to arbitrate, where 
non-compliance with such requirement may remove the consent of the host state to arbitration 
and deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction ratione voluntatis over the dispute.  
 
The offer and acceptance model comprising the foundations of any arbitration 
agreement essential to jurisdiction of any arbitral tribunal in ICSID Convention arbitration 
proceedings described in detail in previous sections of the study represents jurisdictional 
requirements that need to be satisfied under regular circumstances. However, once the host state 
decides to denounce the ICSID Convention, the regular offer and acceptance model collides 
with the unilateral act of the host state aimed to terminate rights and obligations of the host state 
stemming from the ICSID Convention. Subsequent sections of the study will firstly elaborate 
the denunciation of the ICSID Convention by a contracting state and subsequently analyse 
the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals within the six-month time lag following the date 
of denunciation and the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals after six-month time lag elapses. 
 
3.2. Denunciation of the ICSID Convention by a contracting state 
 
The ICSID Convention is exclusively procedural multilateral international treaty 
that establishes the most commonly used dispute settlement forum for international investment 
disputes. With regard to principles of state sovereignty and autonomy to enter into treaty 
obligations, any contracting state to the ICSID Convention has a right to denounce 
the ICSID Convention. However, as elaborated in previous parts of this study, the international 
investment disputes based on the BITs and subject to ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings 
are concerned with complex structure of legal relationships between the host state, 
the home state of the foreign investor and the foreign investor himself. Rights and obligations 
originating from these legal relationships are usually stemming from three mutually 
independent legal instruments: (i) the BIT concluded between the host state and the home state 
of the investor; (ii) the ICSID Convention which contracting states are both the host state and 
the home state of the investor; and (iii) the arbitration agreement concluded between the host 
state and the foreign investor that is most commonly implied from the offer and acceptance 
model applicable to investment arbitration disputes. Given the intertwined nature of the rights 
and obligations stemming from these three legal instruments, it is undisputable that 
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any withdrawal of the party from either the ICSID Convention or the BIT will adversely affect 
the rights and obligations in the rest of the legal relationships within the complex international 
investment dispute.  
The ICSID Convention contains specific provisions governing the denunciation 
by any of its contracting states.130 Nevertheless, on closer examination of wordings 
of denunciation provisions it may be seem that the provisions by themselves do not provide 
clear and unambiguous interpretation of the denunciation process including the rights 
and obligations concerned with unilateral withdrawal of the state from the ICSID Convention 
regime. The decision-making practice of the arbitral tribunals have not been unified 
as to the interpretation of the denunciation of the ICSID Convention by the host state 
and its effects on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals in particular investment disputes. 
Such split decision-making practice of the arbitral tribunals gave rise to contradictory decisions 
on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals rendered in cases concerned with the denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention by the host state. 
 
Prior to detailed analysis of the denunciation provisions of the ICSID Convention, 
a reasonable amount of emphasis should be put on the fundamental jurisdictional provisions 
of the ICSID Convention, being the corner stone and interpretative basis for any elaborations 
on jurisdictional requirements of ICSID arbitration proceedings. In compliance with a principle 
of consensual nature of arbitration proceedings, the Preamble of the ICSID Convention declares 
that mere ratification, acceptance or approval of the Convention cannot suffice neither 
to obligation of the state to refer an investment dispute to the ICSID arbitration, nor to compel 
the state to submit to arbitration proceedings.131 The preamble affirms that requirement 
of the consent given by both parties to the investment dispute is essential 
to any ICSID arbitration proceedings and the bare membership of the state 
to the ICSID Convention can never replace the requirement of given consent to particular 
ICSID arbitration proceedings.132 This declaration is subsequently evolved and rendered legally 
binding and enforceable via art. 25 of the ICSID Convention, being considered the fundamental 
provision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre.  
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Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention states:  
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the 
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the 
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally.  
The wording of the art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention establishes jurisdictional 
requirements ratione materiae, i.e. referring to the nature of the investment dispute, 
and ratione personae, i.e. referring to the parties of an investment dispute. The provision 
also provides basis for jurisdiction ratione voluntatis, i.e. the consent to arbitrate of parties 
to the investment dispute.133 With regard to the jurisdiction ratione voluntatis, the main 
subject of elaborations in this study, the art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention expands 
the aforementioned declaration stated in the Preamble of the ICSID Convention and introduces 
the consent of the parties to the dispute as the essential requirement of the jurisdiction 
of any ICSID Tribunal. The ratione voluntatis is entirely subjective criterion in comparison 
to other requirements that are based on objective nature.134 Even though the contracting states 
accede the ICSID Convention in order to gain access to the ICSID arbitration forum, 
the ratification of the ICSID Convention by itself does not oblige the contracting state 
to consent to the jurisdiction of any ICSID Tribunal in any investment dispute. Similarly, 
the accession of the contracting state to the ICSID dispute settlement system cannot 
give rise to any expectations that such consent of the contracting state in any particular 
investment dispute will be given. Providing consent to arbitration in every particular case 
remains at the sole discretion of a contracting state and in majority of cases is provided 
indirectly via the offer incorporated in the particular BIT. However, once a contracting state 
validly consents to ICSID arbitration proceedings, his consent extends to all rights 
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and obligations stemming from the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Centre rules 
and regulations.135  
The art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention prescribes the requirement of written form. 
Compliance with this requirement usually does not raise many issues as the offer 
of the host state incorporated in the particular BIT inherently takes written form and 
the acceptance of the foreign investor is usually conducted via filing of Request for Arbitration 
and subsequent initiation of arbitration proceedings.  
The importance of ascertainment of whether the consent to arbitration was given 
and at what particular time the consent was perfected, plays crucial role especially 
in connection with denunciation of the ICSID Convention and termination of the BITs. 
The moment of perfection of the consent gives rise to substantial legal consequences consisted 
of rights and obligations vested in the parties to the ICSID arbitration proceedings. The parties 
to the dispute will no longer be able to invoke other remedies136, such as pursuing the investment 
claim in national courts or submitting the investment claim to other arbitration forum. 
Moreover, the foreign investor can no longer avail himself of the diplomatic protection provided 
by his home state.137 Once such significant legal consequences arise and the corresponding 
rights and obligations are constituted, no party shall be entitled to unilaterally withdraw 
its consent and thus reverse the emerged arrangement of rights and obligations. 
In order to maintain the impacts of perfected consent and secure the division of rights 
and obligations necessary for proper conduct of ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
the art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention prohibits a party from unilateral withdrawal of its given 
consent. However, it should be noted that such irrevocability of the consent is only applicable 
to consent that has already been perfected, i.e. where the arbitration agreement between 
the parties of the particular investment dispute has been concluded. In the investment cases 
based on breach of the BIT, where the existence of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is assessed 
using the offer and acceptance model, in order for the arbitration agreement to be constituted, 
the offer of the host state incorporated in the BIT has to be accepted by the eligible foreign 
investor. The stand-alone offer of the host state by itself does not constitute the perfected 
consent within the meaning of art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and the host state has a right 
to unilaterally withdraw his offer at any time prior to the acceptance made by the foreign 
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investor. If the foreign investor wishes to render the consent of the host state irrevocable, 
he must duly accept the valid offer of the host state to arbitrate and in this way create 
the perfected consent to ICSID arbitration proceedings. It should be highlighted 
that the prohibition of the withdrawal of perfected consent is restricted only to unilateral 
withdrawal of consent. Should the parties to the dispute enter into mutual agreement 
to terminate their provided consents to arbitration, such mutual withdrawal of consents is 
permitted, as the parties consensually agree to depart from ICSID arbitration proceedings 
in particular investment dispute.138 
 
The ICSID Convention provides two specific provisions governing the process 
of denunciation of the ICSID Convention by a contracting state including the consequences 
and limits of such denunciation. The art. 71 of the ICSID Convention provides:  
 
Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the 
depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months 
after receipt of such notice. 
 
The second provision further governing the denunciation of the ICSID Convention is 
art. 72 that states: 
 
Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not affect 
the rights or obligations under this Convention of that State or of any of its 
constituent subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State arising 
out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before 
such notice was received by the depositary. 
 
In order for the denunciation to be valid, art. 71 of the ICSID Convention prescribes 
the mandatory requirements of the notice of denunciation, i.e. the written form of the notice 
and addressee of the notice. The notice of denunciation shall be addressed to the World Bank, 
the depositary of the ICSID Convention under art. 73 of the ICSID Convention, which has 
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an obligation to notify139 all signatory states of the ICSID Convention of the notice.140 
The decisive moment related to the denunciation of the ICSID Convention triggering 
significant legal consequences corresponds to the day of the receipt of the notice 
by the depositary. According to the art. 71 of the ICSID Convention the date of the receipt 
of the notice of denunciation denotes the commencement of the six-month period, which expiry 
renders the denunciation effective.  
The rights and obligations of the state stemming from its accession 
to the ICSID Convention and adherence to the ICSID arbitration proceedings represents 
two distinct groups of rights and obligations. Both groups are substantially different in nature, 
as one of them is connected to the membership of a contracting state to the ICSID Convention 
and the other encompasses procedural rights and obligations associated with ICSID arbitration 
proceedings. Bearing in mind the complexity and interconnection of both groups of rights 
and obligations, the denunciation of the ICSID Convention may impact rights and obligations 
of each of the groups in different ways. In legal theory and practice emerged distinctive views 
on the meaning and purpose of the six-month time lag set by art. 71 of the ICSID Convention, 
especially concerned with the scope of applicability of stated time lag on different groups 
of rights and obligations. Such diversification of approaches was primarily induced 
by the wording of art. 72 of the ICSID Convention that limits the effects of denunciation 
in relation to the procedural rights and obligations associated with ICSID arbitration 
proceedings.  
The denunciation of the ICSID Convention may adversely affect the ICSID arbitration 
proceedings to which the parties to the dispute already provided their consents. 
Once the arbitration agreement in particular investment dispute has been formed 
and the perfected consent to ICSID arbitration proceedings becomes irrevocable, additional 
safeguards need to be established so as to prevent the denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
from overriding the irrevocability of perfected consent. The art. 72 of the ICSID Convention 
was primarily designed to limit such effects of the denunciation and thus prevent the state 
from indirectly withdrawing his validly provided consent to arbitration.141 Nevertheless, 
since the wording of art. 72 of the ICSID Convention refers to the group of procedural rights 
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and obligations associated with the ICSID arbitration proceedings, particular discrepancies 
arise in interpretation of art. 72 in conjunction with art. 71 of the ICISID Convention. 
The wording of both provisions allows different interpretations leading to substantially diverse 
conclusions on the effects of denunciation of the ICSID Convention. The core of contradictive 
interpretations subsists in the scope of application of the six-month period introduced 
by art. 71 of the ICSID Convention. By application of different interpretation methods, some 
of the arbitral tribunals concluded that the six-month time lag applies to both groups of rights 
and obligations, whereas some of the arbitral tribunals restricted the application of six-month 
time lag only to the procedural rights and obligations associated with ICSID arbitration 
proceedings.  
 
The choice of the arbitral tribunal among distinct interpretation approaches 
of the arts. 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention has immense impact on the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Tribunal in the particular investment dispute and therefore may deprive 
the foreign investor of the ICSID arbitration forum in relation to particular investment claim. 
The other adverse effect of the diverse interpretation approaches is the risk of inspiring 
the contracting states to denounce the ICSID Convention in order to release themselves 
from obligation to submit to ICSID arbitration proceedings in particular investment case. 
Both ways of interpretation of the key provisions governing the process and effects 
of denunciation of the ICSID Convention altogether with underlying decisions 
of ICSID Tribunals will be elaborated in following sections of the study.  
 
3.3. Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal during the six-month time lag  
 
Receipt of the written notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
by the depositary denotes the commencement of significant legal consequences associated 
with the process of denunciation of the ICSID Convention. The most significant legal 
consequence triggered by the receipt of the notice is the starting date of the six-month period 
established by art. 71 of the ICSID Convention, after which expiry the denunciation shall take 
effect. Nevertheless, art. 72 of the ICSID Convention contradicts the wording of art. 71 
and seems to restrict the application of the six-month time lag on group of procedural rights 
and obligations associated with ICSID arbitration proceedings.  
From practical point of view, the most substantial controversy arises in situations, 
where the host state provided opened offer to arbitrate in the particular BIT and subsequently 
 
 57 
denounced the ICSID Convention before the eligible foreign investor managed to accept 
the offer of the host state to arbitrate. By following the contradictory interpretation approaches 
of arts. 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention, each approach leads to completely 
opposite conclusion regarding the ability of the foreign investor to accept the offer 
of the host state to arbitrate during the six-month time lag. Therefore, the core 
of the interpretation controversies subsists in effect and implications of the notice 
of denunciation on the offer of the host state to arbitrate investment disputes 
in ICSID arbitration forum. For these reasons, the effect and implications of the notice 
of denunciation on the consent of the host state to ICSID arbitration incorporated 
in the particular BIT is subject to ongoing legal discussions.142 Since the consent 
of the host state to ICSID arbitration belongs to the group of procedural rights and obligations 
of the state associated with the ICSID arbitration proceedings, it is much distinguishable 
from the group of rights and obligations of the state arising from its membership 
to ICSID Convention. The ICSID Convention does not provide specification on which of stated 
groups of rights and obligations of the denouncing state remains in existence during 
the prescribed six-month time lag and which ceases to exist at the moment of the receipt 
of notice of denunciation by the depositary. As stated in previous section of this study, two main 
contradictory approaches emerged in recent decisions of ICSID Tribunals that were concerned 
with situations, where the states in the Latin America have denounced the ICSID Convention, 
exposing the foreign investors to the risk of losing the ICSID arbitration forum originally 
designated for resolving their investment disputes with the host state.  
 
3.3.1. Venoklim approach affirming the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal during 
six-month time lag despite the denunciation of the ICSID Convention  
 
In January 2012 the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela addressed a written notice 
of denunciation of the ICSID Convention to the World Bank, the depositary 
of the ICSID Convention.143 Some of the foreign investors entitled under particular BITs 
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to have their investment claims against Venezuela resolved in ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
accepted the offer of Venezuela contained in particular BIT and thus initiated ICSID arbitration 
proceedings during the six-month period following the submission of notice of denunciation. 
The ICSID Tribunals in cases Blue Bank v Venezuela144 and Venoklim v Venezuela145 were 
concerned with this particular scenario. As both of the ICSID Tribunals held that Venezuela 
did not revoke its offer to arbitrate at the moment of submitting the notice of denunciation 
and her offer to arbitrate remained opened for acceptance until the expiration 
of the following six-month time lag, the foreign investors were entitled to accept the offer 
to arbitrate during the six-month period. By affirming the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals 
within the six-month time lag, despite the prior denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
by the host state, decisions of ICSID Tribunals in Blue Bank v Venezuela and 
Venoklim v Venezuela represent two most significant decisions that adopted the first 
interpretation approach.  
 
The ICSID Convention, as procedural multilateral international treaty is subject 
to well-established rules governing international treaties contained in customary international 
law and the VCLT. In conformity with general rules on termination of international treaties, 
particularly art. 54(a) of the VCLT, the ICSID Convention establishes its own lex specialis rule 
in art. 71, by which it governs the process of denunciation by a contracting state. The art. 71 
of the ICSID Convention states that a contracting state may denounce the ICSID Convention 
by written notice to the depositary of the ICSID Convention and the denunciation becomes 
effective six months after the receipt of the notice. In order to interpret the wording 
of the art. 71 of the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal shall apply rules of interpretation 
of international treaties incorporated in art. 31 of the VCLT, encompassing the customary rules 
of international treaty interpretation. Following the general interpretation rule 
of art. 31 of the VCLT, the terms in a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning given to them, in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.146 
In Blue Bank v Venezuela the ICSID Tribunal conducted grammatic analysis 
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of the art. 71 of the ICSID Convention and concluded that the article consists of mandatory 
language, i.e. uses the term “shall”, when describing the moment when the denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention becomes effective. On a plain reading of the art. 71 of the 
ICSID Convention, the denunciation becomes effective only after the expiry of six-month time 
lag commenced at the date of receipt of the notice of denunciation by the depositary.147 
According to the principle of effect utile, the rule of effectiveness, the unwritten 
rule of interpretation of international treaties emerged from international practice, 
by interpreting the provisions of a treaty, the complete weight and effect must be given 
to each term of a treaty, allowing all of the terms of a treaty to provide their full reason 
and meaning. Following the decisions of ICJ Spain v Canada148 and 
Georgia v Russian Federation149, such interpretation of any provision of a treaty that would 
deprive the provision of any meaning or any effect, would contravene the well-established 
rule of effectiveness.150 Therefore, any interpretation disregarding the six-month time lag 
established by art. 71 of the ICSID Convention and attribute the denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention to become effected at the moment of filing the notice of denunciation 
would deprive the six-month time period of any effect.151 
With regard to the reason and meaning of the six-month waiting period, it should 
be noted that the multilateral international treaties usually provide a designated time period 
commencing at the date of the act of denunciation of the treaty and finishing within prescribed 
period of time, rendering the denunciation effective. Institute of waiting periods associated 
with effectivity of the denunciation is primarily aimed to safeguard legal certainty between 
the denouncing state and rest of the contracting states, protect their legal interests and provide 
for space for further negotiations.152 The application of the waiting periods associated 
with process of denunciation of the international treaties was also elaborated by the ICJ in case 
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Nicaragua v Colombia153. In Nicaragua v Colombia the art. 56 of the American Treaty 
on Pacific Settlement154 entitled a contracting state to denounce the treaty by addressing 
a notice of denunciation to the Pan American Union, with the denunciation becoming effective 
upon expiry of one-year period following the submission of a notice. Nicaragua initiated 
the proceedings before the ICJ within the one-year time lag following the notice of denunciation 
submitted by Colombia. Colombia preliminary objected the jurisdiction of the ICJ based 
on argumentation that the notice of denunciation had immediate effect. The ICJ rejected 
the jurisdictional objection of Colombia and affirmed the jurisdiction over the dispute, 
reasoning that denunciation shall take effect upon expiry of one-year time lag after the notice 
of denunciation and any other interpretation of the art. 56 resulting in decline of jurisdiction 
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement 
as a whole.155 By rendering this conclusion the ICJ confirmed the general object and purpose 
of the waiting period associated with denunciation incorporated in the wording of a treaty itself.  
Moreover, the ICJ further enlarged the relevance and meaning of the time lags 
connected to the process of denunciation of international treaties. The ICJ held that even though 
the international treaty does not incorporate in its wording any specific waiting period 
postponing the effectiveness of the notice of denunciation, it is a general rule of international 
customary law that reasonable time period shall be applied rendering the denunciation 
of a treaty effective.156 In the case Nicaragua v United States157 the ICJ concluded that granting 
a reasonable time period for process of termination of an international treaty that does 
not contain any provision governing this matter represents the requirement of the principle 
of good faith.158  
In line with the approaches and reasonings provided by the ICJ, the ICSID Tribunal 
in Venoklim v Venezuela concluded that the six-month time lag established 
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in art. 71 of the ICSID Convention was originally designed to protect the foreign investors 
from the adverse jurisdictional impacts of the denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
by the host state. The ICSID Tribunal emphasized the safeguarding character 
of the six-month time lag preventing the host state from misusing the institute of denunciation 
particularly in cases of unpredictable denunciations, where the foreign investors could 
not have predicted such act of the host state.159  
 
As the object and purpose of the six-month period established 
in art. 71 of the ICSID Convention has been interpreted in previous paragraphs, 
further elaborations should be provided on the effects of such six-month time lag on the offer 
of the host state to arbitrate and its provided consent to ICSID arbitration proceedings. 
In both cases Blue Bank v Venezuela and Venoklim v Venezuela the host state unilaterally 
consented to the ICSID arbitration proceedings via incorporation of the offer to arbitrate 
in respective BITs. As elaborated in previous sections of the study, such opened offer 
of the host state represents general unilateral consent to arbitrate the investment disputes 
in ICSID arbitration forum opened for acceptance of any eligible foreign investor 
under the respective BIT. In order for the arbitration agreement to be formed 
and thus jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal established in particular investment dispute, 
the offer of the host state must be duly accepted by the foreign investor.  
In cases Blue Bank v Venezuela and Venoklim v Venezuela the ICSID Tribunals 
analysed the art. 72 of the ICSID Convention as the provision prescribing the effect 
of denunciation of the ICSID Convention on consent given by the host state. The key issue 
to consider within this interpretation was the term “consent” used in art. 72 and ascertaining 
whether the term shall be interpreted as the unilateral or perfected consent of the parties 
to ICSID arbitration proceedings. The term “consent” within its general meaning may address 
either the unilateral consent, i.e. consent given by one party to ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
or perfected consent, i.e. consents given by both parties to the ICSID arbitration proceedings 
that jointly forms the arbitration agreement.160 Following the general rules of interpretation 
of the international treaties enshrined in art. 31(1) of the VCLT, the grammatical interpretation 
of term “consent” leads to ambiguous conclusion, the term shall be interpreted 
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within the context and with regard to the object and purpose of the provision containing 
the analysed term.161 Within the contextual elaboration of art. 72 of the ICSID Convention, 
the wording “given by one of them” implies that the term “consent” refers to rather unilateral 
consent given by one of the parties to the dispute, i.e. the host state or the foreign investor.162 
This interpretation may also be supported by the wording of art. 25 of the ICSID Convention, 
the corner stone jurisdictional provision of the entire ICSID Convention, which explicitly refers 
to the “consent by both parties”, i.e. the perfected consent. It may be argued that once 
the ICSID Convention expressly qualifies the term “consent” as the perfected one in one of its 
provisions, it would make such qualification also in other provisions. Since the wording 
of art. 72 of the ICSID Convention does not explicitly refer to the perfected consent, 
the interpretation of the term “consent” should rather lead to the unilateral consent.  
When analysing the object and purpose of the art. 72 of the ICSID Convention, 
the ICSID Tribunal in Venoklim v Venezuela hold that the purpose of the art. 72 is the protection 
of group of procedural rights and obligations of parties to the investment dispute that arise 
out of their provided consents to arbitration. As host state incorporated its valid offer to arbitrate 
in the particular BIT, it has obligation to submit to the ICSID arbitration proceedings once his 
offer to arbitrate was duly accepted by the foreign investor.163 Such obligation of the host state 
to abide by the ICSID arbitration proceedings shall last until the offer of the host state is 
lawfully withdrawn, in order to reflect the pacta sunt servanda principle together with principle 
of good faith. Even though the denunciation of the ICSID Convention may eventually result 
in withdrawal of the offer of the host state to arbitrate, the denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention takes effect upon the expiry of the six-month time lag following 
the notice of denunciation. Therefore, the offer of the host state to arbitrate remains opened 
for acceptance by the eligible foreign investor during the six-month period after the receipt 
of the notice of denunciation by the depositary.164 Such procedural rights and obligations 
of the host state stemming from the provided unilateral consent of the host state to the 
ICSID arbitration proceedings cease to exist upon the expiry of the six-month time lag.  
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The ICSID Tribunal in Venoklim v Venezuela stated that any other interpretation 
of the art. 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention would result in undue burden imposed 
on the foreign investor. The foreign investor would have to anticipate the submission 
of the notice of denunciation by the host state and in order to safeguard his access 
to ICSID arbitration forum, the foreign investor would have to accept the offer of the host state 
to arbitrate prior to any such receipt of the notice of denunciation by the depositary. In violation 
of the basic principle of legal certainty, the host state would be free to strategically denounce 
the ICSID Convention at any time convenient and allowed to terminate at his sole discretion 
the obligation to abide by the ICSID arbitration proceedings.165 Such interpretation may 
ultimately lead to evasion of responsibility for breaches of the BIT on behalf of the host state, 
depriving the ICSID Tribunal of the jurisdiction and leaving the foreign investor 
without possibility to have his investment dispute resolved in previously mutually agreed 
arbitration forum.  
 
The first interpretation approach of the arts. 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention 
followed by the arbitral tribunals in cases Blue Bank v Venezuela and Venoklim v Venezuela 
excludes the immediate effect of the notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
on the offer of the host state to arbitrate incorporated in respective BIT and thus allows 
the foreign investor to accept the offer to arbitrate. The argumentations in both ICSID cases are 
mainly based on the general object and purpose of the waiting periods associated 
with denunciation of the international treaties, the rule of effectiveness, pacta sunt servanda 
principle and legal certainty. The underlying basis of this interpretation approach is 
the protection of the foreign investor from strategic denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
by the host state that could otherwise deliberately evade his legal obligation to submit 
to the ICSID arbitration proceedings to which he consented in his offer to arbitrate in particular 
BIT and thus avoid potential responsibility for his unlawful conduct. 
 
3.3.2. Favianca approach excluding the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal during 
six-month time lag given the denunciation of the ICSID Convention  
 
Submission of the notice of denunciation by Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
in January 2012 affected large number of foreign investors entitled under respective BITs 
 




to submit their investment disputes against Venezuela to ICSID arbitration forum. However, 
not all of the ICSID Tribunals were united in respect of their interpretation approach 
of the effects of denunciation on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. The most significant 
case in which the foreign investor accepted the offer of the host state to arbitrate during 
the six-month time lag and the arbitral tribunal concluded that the notice of denunciation 
immediately excluded the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal, was the case 
Favianca v Venezuela166. In Favianca v Venezuela the arbitral tribunal significantly departed 
from previous decisions of the ICSID Tribunals elaborated in previous section of the study. 
However controversial this decision may seem, its reasoning is strongly rooted in interpretation 
approach emerging from legal theory and supported by renowned scholars. The second 
interpretation approach is based on division of groups of rights and obligations affected 
by the denunciation of the ICSID Convention, where group of rights and obligations is affected 
by immediate effect of the notice of denunciation, whereas the other group of rights 
and obligations is concerned with the effects of denunciation after expiry of the six-month time 
lag. 
 
In order to establish jurisdiction of any arbitral tribunal in ICSID Convention 
arbitration proceedings, the parties to the investment dispute must comply with fundamental 
requirements set in art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. The art. 25 of the ICSID Convention 
requires the parties to consent to submission of any investment dispute in writing 
to the ICSID Centre. Once both parties provided their consents to ICSID arbitration 
proceedings, no party may withdraw its provided consent unilaterally. Applying the general 
rules of interpretation of international treaties enshrined in arts. 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
on the wording of art. 25 of the ICSID Convention, both grammatical and contextual method 
of interpretation suggest that the art. 25 of the ICSID Convention refers to the requirement 
of perfected consent of the parties to the investment dispute. This conclusion may also 
be supported by the wording contained in the Preamble to the ICSID Convention, stating 
that the contracting states to the ICSID Convention recognise that mutual consent 
given by the parties to submit the disputes to arbitration constitutes a binding agreement.167 
The Preamble to the ICSID Convention indicates that the perfected consent provided 
 
166 Fábrica de Vidrios Los Andes, C.A. and Owens-Illinois de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/21, Award of the Tribunal, 13 November 2017. 
 




by both parties to the investment dispute forms an underlying object and purpose 
of the ICSID Convention, represents sine qua non of any ICSID Convention arbitration 
proceedings and thus operates as fundamental condition to jurisdiction 
of any ICSID Tribunal.168  
Given the peculiar character of the international investment arbitration being termed 
as “arbitration without privity”, the consent of both parties to the investment dispute does 
not have to be contained in one document, but it is rather very common for the consents 
to be incorporated into separate documents, i.e. the offer of the host state and the acceptance 
of the foreign investor. Once both consents of the parties are duly provided, they jointly 
constitute the perfected consent and thus give rise to arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, 
in order for the foreign investor to duly accept the offer of the host state to arbitrate incorporated 
in the particular BIT, the standing offer must be still valid and opened by the time 
of the acceptance. If the investor attempts to accept the offer not in a timely manner, no consent 
will be provided on behalf of the host state that would result in creation of the perfected consent 
and lead to satisfaction of the fundamental requirement for establishing jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Tribunal in particular case.  
The ICSID Tribunal in the case Favianca v Venezuela concluded that the notice 
of denunciation of the ICSID Convention by itself withdraws the standing offer of the host state 
to ICSID arbitration proceedings incorporated in particular BIT.169 The starting point 
of the interpretation approach leading to such conclusion subsists in special nature 
of the ICSID arbitration that is governed by set of rules contained in two mutually independent 
international treaties, i.e. the ICSID Convention and the particular BIT. Both of the international 
treaties prescribe different set of rules and conditions that need to be jointly satisfied 
in order for the ICSID Tribunal to establish its jurisdiction over particular investment dispute. 
Once some of the rules and conditions stemming from one of the stated treaties are not satisfied, 
the ICSID Tribunal cannot have a jurisdiction over the particular dispute.170 Therefore, the acts 
of the parties to the dispute are reflected in the fulfilment of rules and conditions stemming 
from both ICSID Convention and particular BIT. If the host state denounces 
the ICSID Convention, the offer of the host state may be adversely affected by the act 
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of denunciation conducted by the host state within its position as a contracting state 
to the ICSID Convention. Once the host state submits the notice of denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention, the requirement under one of the treaties, the ICSID Convention, 
ceases to be satisfied, which ultimately deprives the standing offer of the denouncing host state 
of its legal effects. 
In line with the well-established principle of international law on treaties, a contracting 
party to the international treaty may withdraw from international treaty in conformity with 
the specific provisions of the treaty governing the process effects of such withdrawal.171 
The ICSID Convention denunciation regime is governed by arts. 71 and 72 
of the ICSID Convention. Art. 71 of the ICSID Convention entitles a contracting state 
to denounce the ICSID Convention by the way of unilateral declaration taking the form 
of notice of denunciation. Such unilateral declaration terminates the rights and obligations 
of contracting state stemming from its membership to the ICSID Convention altogether 
with legal relationships between the denouncing state and the rest of the contracting states 
to the ICSID Convention.172 According to the precise wording of the art. 71 
of the ICSID Convention, such unilateral withdrawal from the ICSID Convention takes effect 
six months after the receipt of notice of denunciation to the depositary. Upon expiry 
of the prescribed six-month time lag the denouncing contracting state ceases to have the group 
of rights and obligations arising from its position of a party to the ICSID Convention. 
The ICSID Tribunal in Favianca v Venezuela described the group of rights and obligations 
arising from its position of a party to the ICSID Convention contained in the ICSID Convention 
as the right of participation in the Administrative Council173, the right of nomination 
of individuals as conciliators and arbitrators174 and the right of proposal of amendments to 
the ICSID Convention175. The obligations of a contracting state stemming from its position 
as a party to the ICSID Convention the ICSID Tribunal described as the obligation 
of contribution to the financing of the ICSID Centre176, the obligation to grant immunities 
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and privileges to the ICSID Centre within its territory177, the obligation to not exercise 
diplomatic protection in favour of its nationals178 and the obligation of recognition 
and enforcement of the ICSID awards within its territory179.180  
The basis of second interpretation approach affirming the immediate effect of notice 
of denunciation on the offer of the host state to arbitrate subsists in the division of labour 
between the arts. 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention. In Favianca v Venezuela the ICSID 
Tribunal elaborated the scope of application of both provisions imposing distinct effects 
of denunciation on different group of rights and obligations of a denouncing contracting state 
to the ICSID Convention. With regard to the ordinary meaning of terms “Any Contracting State 
may denounce this Convention” used in wording of the art. 71 of the ICSID Convention, 
the ICSID Tribunal interpreted the art. 71 of the ICSID Convention as prescribing the effects 
of the denunciation only in respect of group of rights and obligation of the host state stemming 
from its position as a party to the ICSID Convention. Therefore, the six-month time lag is 
only applicable to the rights and obligations of the host state arising from its position as a party 
to the ICSID Convention, which cease to exist upon the expiry of six months following 
the notice of denunciation. Nevertheless, this conclusion is independent of the effect of notice 
of denunciation on the offer of the host state to arbitrate, which is independently governed 
by art. 72 of the ICSID Convention. Therefore, the six-month time lag is not applicable neither 
to the offer of the host state to arbitrate, nor to the consent of the host state to ICSID arbitration 
proceedings.181 
Following the reasoning of the ICSID Tribunal in Favianca v Venezuela, 
the art. 72 of the ICSID Convention creates specific rule related to another group of rights and 
obligations, i.e. the rights and obligations of a contracting state arising out of the consent 
to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre. The art. 72 of the ICSID Convention provides that 
the notice of denunciation shall not affect the rights and obligations 
under the ICSID Convention arising out of consent to the jurisdiction given prior to the notice 
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od denunciation was received by the depositary. Therefore, the art. 72 of the ICSID Convention 
governs the effects of denunciation on the rights and obligations stemming from the position 
of a contracting state as a party in ICSID arbitration proceedings. When elaborating 
on the potential effects of the denunciation of the ICSID Convention on the position 
of a contracting state as a party to ICSID arbitration proceedings, the ICSID Tribunal 
in Favianca v Venezuela interpreted the term “consent” in art. 72 as a perfected consent. 
The most significant argumentation supporting this conclusion of ICSID Tribunal was 
the proposition that any rights and obligations of the contracting state as a party to 
ICSID arbitration proceedings can never emerge from unilateral consent, as all of the rights 
and obligations belonging to this group only emerge at the moment of creation of perfected 
consent, i.e. upon creation of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the offer of the host state 
to arbitrate incorporated in the particular BIT constitutes merely non-binding promise that can 
be withdrawn unilaterally at the sole discretion of the contracting state at any time prior 
to acceptation by the foreign investor. Such unilateral withdrawal of mere non-binding promise 
of the host state to arbitrate can never give rise to any liability on behalf of the host state.182 
The art. 72 of the ICSID Convention thus shall be interpreted as preserving rights 
and obligations that arise out of perfected consent of the host state and foreign investor 
to the ICSID arbitration proceedings from the effects of unilateral denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention and only perfected consent persists the notice of denunciation.183  
The ICSID Tribunal in Favianca v Venezuela devoted throughout analysis 
of the arguments of the foreign investor that were inspired by decisions of ICSID Tribunals 
upholding the first interpretation approach. The arbitral tribunal in Favianca v Venezuela stated 
that it would be unreasonable to give the term “consent” in art. 72 of the ICSID Convention 
opposite meaning to the one used in art. 25 of the ICSID Convention, the most fundamental 
jurisdictional provision of the entire ICSID Convention. The Tribunal further asserted that 
any adjudication system based on the provided consents of the parties to the dispute is exposed 
to the risk of withdrawal of such consent by one of the parties. Nevertheless, 
the art. 72 of the ICSID Convention at least prevents the already perfected consent 
to ICSID arbitration proceedings from being unilaterally withdrawn. Moreover, the process 
of denunciation of any multilateral international treaty is usually subject to formal procedure 
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within the constitutional system of the host state to which usually precedes political debates 
between state institutions. It is therefore rather unlikely for the foreign investor to face 
completely unexpected filing of notice of denunciation by the host state.184  
 To conclude the basis of interpretation approach relied on in the case 
Favianca v Venezuela, the arts. 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention aim to facilitate 
two completely distinct purposes. The ICSID Convention aimed to govern the complicated 
process of denunciation by establishing two independent provisions, where the first 
one is designed to govern the exit of the contracting state as a party to the ICSID Convention, 
whereas the second one aims to preserve legitimate expectations of the foreign investors 
who entered into arbitration agreement with the contracting state and thus relied on his provided 
consent to ICSID arbitration proceedings. Allowing the offer of the host state to remained 
opened for acceptance by the foreign investor during six-month period following the notice 
of denunciation could potentially expose the host state to considerable amount of newly 
emerged ICSID arbitration proceedings, as the foreign investors would be tempted to accept 
the offer of the host state to arbitrate and try their luck in ICSID arbitration proceedings 
just before the offer of the host state expires.185 
 
The second interpretation approach dividing the effects of the notice of denunciation 
and prohibiting the foreign investor to accept the offer to arbitrate after the notice 
of denunciation has been submitted by the host state did not appear for the first time in the case 
Favianca v Venezuela, as it was already formulated by some of the well renowned scholars 
in the area of investment arbitrations. The reasoning of the ICSID Tribunal was very 
significantly influenced by the opinions of Christoph Schreuer186. However the second 
interpretation approach strictly abides by the principle of the offer and acceptance model 
in investment arbitration, strongly accents the voluntary nature of any arbitration proceedings 
and provides more conformed way of interpretation of the denunciation provisions with 
the fundamental jurisdictional provisions of the ICSID Convention, the Favianca approach 
has been subject to criticism for alleged favouring of the denouncing host states.  
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3.4. Söderlund’s opinion supporting jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal after expiry of the 
six-month time lag 
 
Previous sections of the study introduced and further elaborated two contractional 
interpretation approaches towards the effects of denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
by the host state. Besides the Venoklim and Favianca approaches another frequently discussed 
way of interpretation emerged concerned with the effects of denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention on the jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals. The interpretation approach 
was most considerably analysed in the separate opinion of Christer Söderlund in the case 
Blue Bank v Venezuela187. Although no arbitral tribunal dealing with denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention by the contracting state ever adopted this approach into its ruling, 
Söderlund’s opinion is frequently subject to related legal analyses. 
According to the Söderlund’s opinion, the eligible foreign investor has a right to accept 
the offer of the host state to arbitrate not only within the six-month time lag following 
the notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention, but also after the six-month period elapses, 
provided the BIT, in which the offer of the host state is incorporated, remains in force.  
 
The basis for the interpretation approach in Söderlund’s opinion subsists in analysis 
of the offer and acceptance model and its applicability to modern types of ISDS dominantly 
based on BITs. Söderlund notes that at the time of the adoption of the ICSID Convention, 
the ISDS was dominantly based on direct investment contracts concluded between the host state 
and the foreign investor, national legislation of the host state or submission agreement. 
Nevertheless, nowadays the majority of investment disputes is based on the BITs. Therefore, 
it may be argued that the wording of the ICSID Convention does not reflect the ISDS based 
on the BITs, as by the time of its drafting, no such mechanism of ISDS existed.188  
The key issue to consider within the Söderlund approach was whether the consent 
of the host state provided in the particular BIT is prevails withdrawal of the host state from 
the ICSID Convention. The offer and acceptance model was originally introduced for ISDS 
based on national legislation of the host state, in light of which was the art. 72 of the ICSID 
Convention initially worded. Söderlund in his opinion challenges the traditional offer 
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and acceptance model and states that the consent to ICSID arbitration proceedings is already 
perfected by conclusion of the BIT containing the respective dispute resolution clause. 
The BIT represents independent international treaty creating rights and obligations between 
the contracting states alongside with the benefits provided to third parties, i.e. the foreign 
investors. As the BIT is concluded between the host state and home state of the investor, 
the dispute resolution clause represents already provided perfected consent to ICSID arbitration 
proceedings. The foreign investor is merely a beneficiary of the BIT, not the contracting party 
to the BIT, and thus is not in a position of an appropriate party to consent 
to the ICSID arbitration proceedings. The right of the foreign investor to initiate 
ICSID arbitration proceedings represents merely a procedural right vested with the beneficiary 
of the BIT.189 The contracting states to the BIT obliged themselves to the rights and obligations 
for the duration of the treaty itself. Therefore, the consent incorporated in dispute resolution 
clause in the particular BIT remains in effect throughout the duration of the BIT. Therefore, 
the ICSID arbitration forum shall be accessible not only during the six-month time lag 
following the notice of denunciation, but also after the expiry of such period 
until the termination of the BIT.190 
 
The interpretation approach described in Söderlund’s opinion argues against the offer 
and acceptance model used in modern international investment arbitrations based on the BITs 
and overstretches the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre over a lifetime of the particular BIT. 
The Söderlund’s approach alleges that investment arbitration was not initially concerned 
with phenomenon known as “arbitration without privity” and the BITs concluded between 
the host states and home states of the investors provide already perfected consent to arbitration 
proceedings. Even though membership of the contracting states to the ICSID Convention 
enables the access to ICSID arbitration forum, denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
by the host state cannot adversely affect the already established perfected consent in the BIT. 
In conclusion, the foreign investor is entitled to initiate ICSID arbitration proceedings 
at any time during the validity of the particular BIT, as such conduct of the foreign investor 
should not be regarded as acceptation of the offer to arbitrate, but rather procedural right 
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stemming from his beneficiary position within the particular BIT. Söderlund’s interpretation 
approach represents the most radical depart from the general concept of the ICSID Convention 
arbitration proceedings applied by the ICSID arbitral tribunals and carries the risk of excessive 
burden imposed on the host states having no other chance but to submit to every 
ICSID arbitration proceedings initiated against them at any time during the lifetime 




4. UNILATERAL AND CONSENSUAL TERMINATION 
OF THE BIT 
 
 
The foreign direct investment conducted by the foreign investor within the territory 
of the host state may take various forms. With regard to the frequently long-term nature 
of the foreign investment business, its contributions to the economy of the host state and 
dependence on the overall political and social climate of the host state, the investment usually 
requires granting of a long-term protection. In order to provide sufficiently enduring long-term 
protection for the foreign investors, the instruments of international law took the prime lead 
within the area of cross-border direct investment. Subsequently, the BITs became 
the dominantly used instrument in the field of foreign direct investment protection. 
In comparison to the national legislation of the host state, one of the most significant advantage 
of the BITs is that they are based on consensual nature and thus cannot be unilaterally 
amended.191  
Nevertheless, despite the stable and enduring nature of the BITs, 
as any other consensual legal instrument, the BITs may be overridden by the intentions of their 
contracting parties. As any other international treaty, every BIT may be either unilaterally 
terminated by one of its contracting parties in accordance with the rules on international treaties, 
or consensually terminated by conclusion of agreement on termination between its contracting 
parties. The last chapter of the study elaborates the effects of unilateral and consensual 
termination of the BITs on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal over investment disputes arising 
out of the terminated BIT.  
 
4.1. Unilateral termination of the BIT 
 
As any other international treaty, the BIT is governed by the public international law 
rules on international treaties. As elaborated in the second chapter of this study, 
any international treaty, including the BIT, may be unilaterally terminated by its contracting 
party in conformity with art. 54(a) of the VCLT. According to the art. 54(a) of the VCLT, 
the BIT may be terminated in compliance with the provisions of the treaty itself. It is a common 
practice for the BITs to incorporate provisions governing the termination of the BIT itself. 
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The termination provision in the BIT may prescribe the fixed term period, upon which expiry 
either party may terminate the BIT by a notice of termination addressed to the other contracting 
party. In such case the termination becomes effective after designated period of time following 
the receipt of the notice of termination. The minority of the BITs provides for another 
termination mechanism, subsisting in tacit renewal of the BIT. In cases of tacit renewals, 
the BIT prescribes a period of time during which it remains in force. Short time 
prior to the expiry of designated time period, any contracting party is entitled to terminate 
the BIT within prescribed short period of time. If no party terminates the BIT 
within such designated period of time, the BIT will be tacitly renewed for another term.192 
 
The BITs between the host state and home state of the investor are usually concluded 
for prescribed long period of time, most frequently ranging from ten to twenty years. However, 
given the long-term nature of the foreign direct investment, it is common for the BITs to contain 
provisions prolonging the investment protection for another period of time, usually another ten 
to twenty years, after the termination of the BIT.193 Such standardised type of provision is 
known as the “sunset clause” or “survival clause”. The ICSID Tribunal in case 
UP and CD v Hungary194 held that the so-called sunset clauses represent peculiar provision 
used in international investment agreements that extends the legal rights and obligations related 
to the protection of the investment for prescribed time period after the termination of the BIT. 
However, the application of the sunset clause is not entirely unlimited, but by default rather 
reasonably restricted only to the investments made within the territory of the host state 
prior to the termination of the BIT, i.e. during the time when the BIT was still initially in force, 
unless the wording of the sunset clause itself provides otherwise.195 The object and purpose 
of the sunset clauses is to safeguard legitimate expectations of the foreign investors, 
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who are commencing their investments within the territory of the host state and their 
investments are likely to outlive the prescribed lifetime of the BIT, and protect the foreign 
investors from unpredictable termination of the BIT by one of the contracting parties. 
The additional period following the unilateral termination, during which is the extended 
protection of investment is granted, allows the foreign investor to adapt to the situation 
concerned with adverse effects of the BIT termination.196 
 
Unilateral termination of the BIT by a contracting state ultimately brings rights 
and obligations stemming out of the provisions of the BIT to an end, including the provision 
of the BIT containing the consent of the host state to ICSID arbitration. Once the unilateral 
termination of the BIT becomes effective, the consent of the host state is deemed 
to be withdrawn. Nevertheless, the exception applies in relation to the so-called sunset clauses, 
which have the ability to extend both substantive and procedural protection of the investment 
provided under the BIT prior to its termination. In the case Gavazzi v Romania197 
it was confirmed that the sunset clause protects the consent of the host state provided 
in terminated BIT from effects of termination and prolongs the validity of provided consent 
to ICSID arbitration proceedings for the period of time prescribed in the particular sunset 
clause. Thus, the foreign investor is entitled to institute ICSID arbitration proceedings 
at any time within the duration of the sunset clause.198 
The application of the sunset clause is typically associated with the unilateral 
termination of the BIT that triggers the application of the sunset clause provision. The key 
concern associated with unilateral termination of the BIT is the one-sided character of the act 
of termination leaving the other contracting party without any chance to retain control 
over the ongoing protection of its investors. The sunset clauses have indisputably irreplaceable 
role in unilateral terminations of the BITs, nevertheless, their application in the cases 
of consensual termination of the BITs is subject to contradictory opinions.199 
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4.2. Consensual termination of the BIT 
 
Besides the unilateral termination, the BIT may also be terminated consensually, 
i.e. by mutual agreement to terminate the BIT concluded between the parties. Such mutual 
termination of international treaties is anticipated by the art. 54(b) of the VCLT. Consensual 
termination of the BIT is substantially different from the unilateral termination, 
as within the consensual termination the contracting states to the BITs mutually agree to bring 
their rights and obligations stemming from the concluded treaty to an end. Nevertheless, 
protection of foreign direct investment originating from the international investment 
agreements represents complex multilateral relationship between the host states, home states 
and foreign investors.  As the contracting parties to the BIT are the host state and the home state 
of the investor, any mutual act of termination of the BIT conducted by the contracting parties, 
however consensual in its nature, will ultimately adversely affect the rights of the foreign 
investor stemming from the terminated BIT. In cases of unilateral termination, the contracting 
parties to the BIT tend to balance such discrepancy by incorporation of the so-called sunset 
clauses aimed to protect the foreign investors of the contracting state, which did not initiate 
the unilateral termination of the BIT. However, as the institute of sunset clauses is closely 
connected primarily to the unilateral termination, the scope of its application in cases 
of consensual termination is highly disputed.200  
 
On one hand, consensual termination of the BIT suggests that both contracting states 
desire to cease to protect the foreign investors coming from one contracting state to the territory 
of another. Therefore, it may be argued that there is no necessity to provide for any safeguards, 
such as sunset clauses, preserving the foreign investors of the respective contracting states 
from the effects of the BIT termination. In practice some of the contracting states201 to the BITs 
approached the consensual termination in two steps. Firstly, the contracting states to the BIT 
agreed on amendment of the BIT explicitly terminating the survival clause. Secondly, 
the contracting states to the BIT entered into agreement on termination of the BIT in its 
amended wording, i.e. without the sunset clause. By this way the contracting parties took a safe 
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approach that guaranteed the inapplicability of the sunset clause on the consensually terminated 
BIT.202  
On the other hand, the ICSID Tribunal in case Magyar v Hungary203 elaborated 
the effects of consensual termination of the BIT on the applicability of sunset clause aiming 
to protect eligible foreign investors for a designated period of twenty years after the termination 
of the BIT. The ICSID Tribunal stated that even though the contracting states are masters 
of the BIT, the international treaty, the mount of control that the contracting states may exercise 
over the treaty shall be limited by the principle of legal certainty. The observance 
of the principle of legal certainty is crucial for the protection of foreign investors, 
who commenced their investments within the territory of the host state under provided treaty 
guarantees. For these reasons, exclusion of application of sunset clause by consensually 
terminating the BIT would disrespect the long-term interests of the foreign investors 
who anticipated the protection prescribed in the BIT with possibility of extension based 
on the incorporated sunset clause.204 
 
The most significant example of the consensual termination of the BITs represents 
the Agreement for the Termination of BITs Between the Member States of the European 
Union205. The Agreement for the Termination was signed by twenty-three member states 
of the EU that consensually terminated over 277 BITs between the member states of the EU.206 
The Agreement for the Termination was the ultimate consequence of the decision of the CJEU 
in case Slovak Republic v Achmea207 concerned with compatibility of the arbitration clauses 
contained in the BITs concluded between member states of the EU with the EU law. In this case 
 
202  TITI, Catharine (2016). Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment: Survival Clauses and Reform of International 
Investment Law. Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 33, No. 5, p. 436. 
 
203  Magyar Farming Company Ltd, Kintyre Kft and Inicia Zrt v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/27, Award 
of the Tribunal, 13 November 2019.  
 
204  Magyar v Hungary, Award of the Tribunal, 13 November 2019, paras. 222-223. 
205  Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European 
Union, signed 5 May 2020, in force 29 August 2020. 
206  MOARBES, Charbel A. (2021). Introductory note to Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Between the Member States of the European Union. International Legal Materials, Vol. 60, No. 1, 
p. 99. 
 





the CJEU hold that ISDS mechanism incorporated in the BITs concluded between the EU 
member states is incompatible with EU law, as it violates autonomy of the EU law and mutual 
trust between the member states.208 The CJEU reasoned its judgement by the peculiar nature 
of the EU law and its interpretation, within which the institute of preliminary ruling plays 
a crucial role. Given the distinctive adjudicative nature of the ISDS mechanism and investment 
arbitration proceedings in particular, the CJEU ruled that arbitration tribunals are neither 
entitled nor obliged to request preliminary ruling in CJEU, which would ultimately lead 
to allowing arbitral tribunals to interpret questions concerning EU law with binding effect. 
Therefore, concluding of the BIT between two EU member states with incorporated ISDS 
mechanism results in situation, where the adjudicative organs that are not part of the EU judicial 
system would interpret the EU law in a way that does not ensure the full effectiveness 
of EU law.209 
In the light of the Slovak Republic v Achmea judgement, the EU member states were 
strongly encouraged by the EU to terminate all BITs concluded with another EU member states. 
The emerged Agreement for the Termination terminated all BITs between twenty-three EU 
member states. As most of the terminated BITs contained the sunset clauses capable 
of prolonging the applicability of investment protection after the termination of the respective 
BIT and entitling the foreign investors to initiate arbitral proceedings for prescribed period 
of time following the termination, the Agreement for the Termination explicitly excluded 
triggering and subsequent application of the sunset clauses in respective BITs. Moreover, 
the Agreement for the Termination went even further and deprive all sunset clauses currently 
applicable of their legal effects due to prior termination of the respective BITs.210 Nevertheless, 
even though the member states, as the contracting parties to the BITs, are fully entitled 
to consensually terminate the BITs including the application of the newly triggered sunset 
clauses, it is highly disputable whether the member states may retrospectively ban 
the application of already triggered sunset clauses. The latter mentioned group of sunset clauses 
already provided prolonged substantial and procedural investment protection to the eligible 
foreign investors. Imposing of such retrospective ban therefore significantly interfere 
with existing rights of the foreign investors.  
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The multilateral Agreement for the Termination represents peculiar way of massive 
withdrawal of offers to arbitrate across EU member states. By explicit exclusion of applicability 
of sunset clauses, the member states prevented any uncertainties regarding the effectivity 
of withdrawal of their consents to arbitration. However, it is highly disputable whether the offer 
of the host state including the consent to arbitrate incorporated in the BIT may 
be retrospectively withdrawn via abrogation of existing sunset clauses. The amplitude 
of the reasonability depends on the assessment, whether and at what moment the offer 
of the host state has already been accepted by the foreign investor, i.e. whether and at what 
moment the perfected consent to arbitration proceedings has been formed. Such arbitration 
proceedings in which the offer of the host state has been accepted by the foreign investor 
and the arbitration proceedings have been concluded, i.e. the final award has been rendered 
or the agreement on settlement of the dispute has been concluded, prior to the issue 
of judgement in the CJEU case Slovak Republic v Achmea211, shall not be affected.212 
On the other hand, any arbitration proceedings that have been initiated on or after the issue 
of Slovak Republic v Achmea judgement, shall not be based on arbitration clauses contained 
in the terminated BITs.213 However, the most surprising effect has been imposed on pending 
arbitration proceedings that have been initiated prior to the issue of Slovak Republic v Achmea 
judgement and are not yet concluded, in which the parties to the arbitration are obliged to follow 
prescribed transitional procedure consisted of obligatory settlement procedure or structured 
dialogue.214 In conclusion, the EU member states by concluding the Agreement 
for the Termination retroactively withdrew their consents under the BITs back to the moment 
of issue of the CJEU judgement in Slovak Republic v Achmea, depriving all of the foreign 
investors, including the ones who already accepted the offer to arbitrate, of designated 
arbitration forums.  
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With regard to complexity of legal relationships emerging from foreign direct 
investment based on BITs and desired long-term nature of protection of investments, 
termination of the BIT represents substantial intervention into the rights and obligations 
of the contracting parties and the eligible foreign investors. Given the one-sided nature 
of the unilateral termination of the BIT, adequate safeguards have emerged within the practice 
of investment protection, such as incorporation of the so-called sunset clauses into the wording 
of the BITs. On the other hand, in cases of consensual termination, the applicability of sunset 
clauses has been largely disputed. It should be noted that however consensually may the mutual 
termination of the BIT seem, the ultimate decision on termination is conducted by the host state 
and home state of the investor, and not the foreign investor himself. The most significant 
plurilateral treaty consensually terminating the BITs between the member states of the EU is 
an example of how harsh deprivation of rights of foreign investors may be hidden 






International investment agreements provide for both substantive and procedural 
protection of foreign investment. The characteristic nature of ICSID arbitration proceedings 
stemming from interconnection between the ICSID Convention, the multilateral procedural 
international treaty, and the BITs, the bilateral international treaties providing primarily 
substantive protection of the foreign investments, gives rise to peculiar triangular nature of legal 
relationships present in international investment dispute. Termination of any international 
investment agreement by the host state significantly interfere with the rights and obligations 
arising out of the investment protection provided by the terminated investment agreement. 
The purpose of the study was to analyse implications of various types of termination 
of international investment agreements on the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals.  
Firstly, within the second chapter of the thesis, the study provided elaboration 
of the ICSID arbitration proceedings, denunciation and unilateral and consensual termination, 
in order to establish framework of legal institutes that represent a starting point for any further 
analyses. The third chapter of the study firstly addressed the first research question, 
i.e. the requirements and conditions for establishment of the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal 
accompanied with analysis of selected standardised types of BIT clauses that may have adverse 
effect on the jurisdiction. Moving to the second research question, the third chapter provided 
analyses of process of denunciation of the ICSID Convention by the host state and its effect 
on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal. The fourth chapter of the study was dedicated to third 
research question, i.e. the unilateral and consensual termination of the BIT and the effects 
of these types of termination on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals. Based on the in-depth 
elaborations conducted throughout the study, the following simplified conclusions may 
be provided.  
 
The first research question: What are the requirements and conditions 
for establishment of the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal a what type of clauses in the BITs 
may adversely affect the jurisdiction? 
The peculiar triangular legal relationships between the host state, home state 
and foreign investor are typical feature of investment arbitration. As the particular BIT 
is concluded between the host state and home state of the investor, the parties 
to the subsequently emerged investment dispute arisen from the breach of BIT are the host state 
and foreign investor. For these reasons, the investment arbitrations are concerned 
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with phenomenon termed “arbitration without privity”, which ultimately results in application 
of the offer and acceptance model used for elaborations on whether the consent to arbitration 
has been provided by both parties to the investment dispute, i.e. the host state and the foreign 
investor.  
The host state incorporates its consent to arbitrate into provisions of the particular BIT, 
which constitutes the offer to arbitrate opened for acceptance by any eligible foreign investor 
under the BIT. However, the foreign investor must be sufficiently careful when assessing 
the wording of the particular BIT, as the offer of the host state to arbitrate may subject 
to prescribed conditions or requirements that need to be satisfied prior to the acceptance. 
Particular attention shall be put on selected standardised types of provisions contained 
in the BIT, that may significantly condition the offer of the host state to arbitrate. Most typical 
examples of such provisions are three types of clauses involving national courts of the host state 
into the dispute resolution, i.e. the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, the obligation 
to seek remedy before national courts for prescribed period of time and “fork in the road” 
provisions. Stated types of clauses may either function as conditions precedent to the offer 
to arbitrate or may ultimately result in exclusion of jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal. Some types 
of the clauses capable of affecting the jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal may be overridden 
by application of “most favoured nation clause” that has restricted ability to modify 
the requirements of the offer to arbitrate by transferring another offer of the host state contained 
in another BIT into present dispute. In order to establish jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal, 
the offer of the host state must be duly accepted by the foreign investor, most frequently by way 
of institution of arbitral proceedings.  
Another standardised provision of the BITs that may impact the ability of the foreign 
investor to accept the offer to arbitrate are “cooling-off periods” obliging the investor 
to endeavour to amicably settle the investment dispute prior to institution of the arbitration 
proceedings.  
 
The second research question: When and under what circumstances does 
the ICSID Tribunal have jurisdiction over the investment dispute if the host state denounces 
the ICSID Convention? 
By denouncing the ICSID Convention, the host state unilaterally withdraws 
from multilateral procedural international treaty that provides the contracting states access 
to ICSID arbitration proceedings. The ICSID Convention by itself governs the process 
of denunciation in art. 71 by introducing a six-month time lag rendering the denunciation 
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of the ICSID Convention effective. On the other hand, art. 72 of the ICSID Convention prevents 
rights and obligations of the denouncing state arising out of consent to jurisdiction from effects 
of six-month time lag. Given the unclear wording of the arts. 71 and 72 of the ICSID 
Convention, two main interpretation approaches emerged in decisions of ICSID Tribunals 
concerned with denunciation of the ICSID Convention by Venezuela.  
The Venoklim approach affirms the jurisdiction within the six-month time lag 
that renders the denunciation effective upon expiry of six months and thus prolongs 
the existence of the offer of the denouncing state to arbitrate until expiry of the six-month time 
lag. This interpretation approach is reasoned by the rule of effectiveness and general purpose 
and object of the waiting periods associated with denunciation of the international treaties. 
On the other hand, Favianca approach declines the jurisdiction during the six-month time lag 
and grants the denunciation immediate effect allowing the denouncing state to withdraw his 
offer to arbitrate immediately at the commencement of the six-month time lag. The second 
interpretation approach is reasoned by the division of two groups of rights and obligations. 
One group of rights and obligations stemms from the position of a contracting state as a party 
to the ICSID Convention, which shall cease to exist upon expiry of the six-month time lag. 
The second group of rights and obligations arises out of the perfected consent to the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Centre, i.e. from arbitration agreement formed by proper acceptance of the valid 
offer to arbitrate. Rights and obligations belonging to this group shall be immune 
from any effects of denunciation. Both interpretation approaches lead to opposite conclusions, 
the Venoklim approach allows the foreign investors to accept the offer of the host state 
to arbitrate within the six-month time lag, whereas the Favianca approach deprives the foreign 
investors of possibility to accept the offer of the host state at any time after the receipt of notice 
of denunciation by the depositary.  
The effects of the denunciation on the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal are highly 
disputable and represents two substantially different approaches playing with the availability 
of procedural protection to the investment of the foreign investor. Besides two stated 
approaches, Söderlund offered another alternative interpretation approach allowing the foreign 
investor to initiate ICSID arbitration at any time throughout the duration of the respective BIT 
containing the consent to arbitration. Reasoning of this approach is based on criticism 
of applicability of the offer and acceptance model on investment arbitrations based on the BITs. 
Söderlund’s approach represents more radical position declining any effects of the denunciation 




The third research question: What effect does have the unilateral and consensual 
termination of the BIT on jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal? 
By unilateral termination of the BIT the host state one-sidedly terminates 
the substantive and procedural protection of foreign investment provided by terminated BIT. 
Even though the unilateral termination withdraws the offer of the host state including consent 
to arbitrate incorporated in the BIT, the “sunset clause”, particular type of standardised 
provision incorporated in the BIT, has ability to preserve the offer to arbitrate for upcoming 
stated period of time. The object and purpose of “sunset clauses” is to prevent the foreign 
investors from adverse effects of unilateral termination of the BIT. As the “sunset clauses” 
are originally associated with unilateral termination, the practice is not unified regarding 
the applicability of “sunset clauses” on consensual terminations.  
The consensual termination prima facie represents more mutual way of termination 
of investment agreements. Nevertheless, given the complex triangular nature of investment 
disputes, the consensus on termination of the BIT is reached between the host state and home 
state of the investor. As the foreign investor is not a contracting party to the BIT, the consensual 
termination may have similar effects on his investment protection as unilateral termination. 
Moreover, it is usual practice for the contracting states to agree on exclusion of applicability 
of “sunset clause” in cases of consensual termination. The most significant example provides 
collective termination of 277 BITs between the member states of the EU, excluding 
the applicability of both newly emerged “sunset clauses” and pending “sunset clauses” being 
already in force. With regard to its retrospective effects, this example of termination of the BITs 
hidden by deceptive consensual character represents the most radical intervention in procedural 
protection of the foreign investors in comparison to all of the previously described types 






A. BOOKS AND CHAPTERS IN BOOKS 
 
BALAŠ, Vladimír, ŠTURMA, Pavel (2018). Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic 
(Prague: Wolters Kluwer ČR). 
 
DOLZER, Rudolf, SCHREUER, Christoph (2008). Principles of International Investment Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
DÖRR, Oliver, SCHMALENBACH, Kirsten (2012). Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg). 
 
DOUGLAS, Zachary (2009). The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
GARNER, Bryan A., BLACK, Henry Campbell (2009). Black’s law dictionary. Ninth edition 
(St. Paul: West). 
 
KNAPP, Viktor (2003). Vědecká propedeutika pro právníky (Praha: Eurolex Bohemia). 
 
KOLB, Robert (2016). The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing). 
 
SCHREUER, Christoph (2010). Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent to 
Arbitration. In: WAIBEL, Michael, KAUSHAL, Asha, LIZ CHUNG, Kyo-Hwa and 
BALCHIN Claire (eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(London: Kluwer Law International), p. 353-368. 
 
SCHREUER, Christoph, MALINTOPPI, Loretta, REINISCH, August, SINCLAIR, Anthony 
(2009). The ICSID Convention: A Commentary. Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy (2010). The International Law on Foreign Investment. 
Third edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
SUBEDI, Surya P. (2008). International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing). 
 
VILLIGER, Mark Eugen (2009). Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers). 
 
B. JOURNAL ARTICLES  
 
BALTAG, Crina (2017). Not Hot Enough: Cooling-Off Periods and the Recent Developments 




GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR, Omar E. (2004). Foreign Investment Disputes under ICSID. A Review of 
its Decisions on Jurisdiction. The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 187-
214.   
 
MOARBES, Charbel A. (2021). Introductory note to Agreement for the Termination of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Between the Member States of the European Union. International 
Legal Materials, Vol. 60, No. 1, p. 99-137. 
 
PAULSSON, Jan (1995). Arbitration Without Privity. ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 232-257. 
 
SCHREUER, Christoph (2005). Calvo's Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in 
Investment Arbitration, The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 4, No. 
1, p. 1-17. 
 
SCHREUER, Christoph (2005). Consent to Arbitration (updated 02/2007). Transnational 
Dispute Management, Vol. 5 (www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=5
55, last accessed on 27 November 2020).  
 
SCHREUER, Christoph (2004). Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella 
Clauses and Forks in the Road. The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 
231-256. 
 
TITI, Catharine (2016). Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment: Survival Clauses and Reform of 
International Investment Law. Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 33, No. 5, p. 425-440. 
 
WAIBEL, Michael (2014). Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility. University 
of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2014. 
 
C. DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS  
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 1 April 
2011, ICJ Rep 70. 
 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada), Judgement of 4 December 1998, ICJ Rep 432. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgement of 26 November 1984, ICJ Rep 392. 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France), Judgement of 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep 457. 
Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 
200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgement of 17 March 2016, ICJ Rep 100. 
Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V., CJEU Case No. C-284/16, Judgement of the Court (Grand 




D. DECISIONS OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
 
Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Ad 
hoc Committee Decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 May 1986. 
 
Antoine Goetz et consorts v. République du Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, 
10 February 1999. 
 
Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/20, Award of the Tribunal, 26 April 2017. 
 
Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/20, Separate Opinion of Christer Söderlund, 13 April 2017. 
 
Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the 
Tribunal on the Objections on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000. 
 
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004. 
 
Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, 24 June 
1998, 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999). 
 
Fábrica de Vidrios Los Andes, C.A. and Owens-Illinois de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/21, Award of the Tribunal, 13 November 
2017. 
 
Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003. 
 
Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2011-17, Award, 31 January 2014. 
 
Magyar Farming Company Ltd, Kintyre Kft and Inicia Zrt v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/17/27, Award of the Tribunal, 13 November 2019.  
 
Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Liability, 21 April 2015. 
 
Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, SCC Case No. 
118/2001, Award, 16 December 2003. 
 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN 3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004. 
 
Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/21, Award, 30 July 2009. 
 
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 




Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 9 ICSID Rep 66, Final Award, 3 September 
2001. 
 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003. 
 
Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
3 August 2004. 
 
Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15, Award, 13 September 2006. 
 
Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 September 2009. 
 
UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018. 
 
Venoklim Holding B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/22, 
Award of the Tribunal, 3 April 2015. 
 
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision 




American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), signed 30 April 1948, in force 6 May 
1949. 
 
Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of 
the European Union, signed 5 May 2020, in force 29 August 2020. 
 
The Energy Charter Treaty, signed 17 December 1994, in force 16 April 1998. 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980.  
Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, signed 18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966. 
 
 
F. ARBITRATION RULES 
 
Administrative and Financial Regulations (2006). 
 
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (2006). 
 







International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2021). About ICSID. Member 
States. Signatory and Contracting States (https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-
states/database-of-member-states, last accessed on 1 April 2021). 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2021). News & Events. News 
Releases. Venezuela Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/venezuela-submits-notice-under-
article-71-icsid-convention, last accessed on 22 May 2021). 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). Resources. Rules and 
Regulations (https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/rules-and-
regulations/convention/overview, last accessed on 15 November 2020). 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). Resources. Rules and 
Regulations. ICSID Additional Facility Rules (https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/rules-and-
regulations/additional-facility-rules/overview, last accessed on 17 November 2020). 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). Services. Arbitration. 
Overview of an Arbitration – ICSID Convention (https://icsid.worldbank.org/services/arbitrati
on/convention/process/overview, last accessed on 25 November 2020). 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2020). The ICSID Case Load – 
Statistics. Issue 2020-2 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20S
tatistics%20%282020-2%20Edition%29%20ENG.pdf, last accessed on 22 November 2020). 
 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (2020). Terminating a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty. IISD Best Practices series. Issue: March 2020 (https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publi
cations/terminating-treaty-best-practices-en.pdf, last accessed on 25 May 2021). 
 
Ius Mundi (2021). Sunset Clause (https://jusmundi.com/en/document/wiki/en-sunset-clause, 
last accessed on 25 May 2021). 
 
Ius Mundi (2021). Trigger Letter (https://jusmundi.com/en/document/wiki/en-trigger-letter-
formal-notice, last accessed on 15 May 2021).  
 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog (2021). Denunciation of ICSID Convention: Re-Visiting Mr. 
Söderlund’s Separate Opinion (http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/05/31/denu
nciation-of-icsid-convention-re-visiting-mr-soderlunds-separate-opinion/, last accessed on 
24 May 2021). 
 
Norton Rose Fulbright (2021). Thought leadership. Publications. Fork-in-the-Road clauses: 
Divergent paths in recent decisions (https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publ




UNCTAD (2020). Investment dispute settlement navigator. Arbitral rules and administering 
institution (https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement, last accessed on 






Mezinárodní arbitráž dle Úmluvy o řešení sporů z investic mezi státy a občany 
druhých států („ICSID arbitráž“ a „ICSID Úmluva“) představuje dominantně využívaný 
mechanismus řešení sporů mezi zahraničními investory a hostitelskými státy. Systém 
mezinárodních investičních rozhodčích soudů autoritativně rozhodující spory z porušení 
dvoustranných mezinárodních dohod na ochranu zahraničních přímých investic („BITs“) 
na území hostitelského státu čelí přetrvávající kritice. Vzrůstající neochota hostitelských států 
k dodržování povinností vyplývajících ze závazných rozhodčích nálezů ve spojení s obecně 
kritickým přístupem k ICSID arbitráži spustilo mezi státy Jižní Ameriky vlnu vypovídání 
mezinárodních dohod o ochraně investic. Ukončení mezinárodních dohod o ochraně investic 
významným způsobem narušuje procesněprávní ochranu zahraničních investic 
a ve svém konečném důsledku zbavuje investora práva na projednání investičního sporu 
proti hostitelskému státu před rozhodčím tribunálem.  
ICSID arbitráže jsou charakteristické vzájemným provázaným působením několika 
mezinárodních dohod o ochraně investic. Mezi tyto mezinárodní dohody se řadí ICSID Úmluva 
a BITs, které ve vzájemné kombinaci vytváří soubor všech náležitostí a podmínek nezbytných 
k založení jurisdikce ICSID rozhodčího tribunálu v daném investičním sporu. Nezbytnou 
podmínkou využití jakéhokoli mechanismu řešení sporů je udělení souhlasu k arbitráži stranami 
sporu. Specifická trojstranná struktura právních vztahů, které ve své kombinaci 
společně utvářejí komplexní strukturu mezinárodního investičního sporu, však ke zkoumání 
uděleného souhlasu s ICSID arbitráží vyžaduje aplikaci rozsáhlé právní analýzy. Různé 
standardizované typy doložek v BITs mohou nepřímo ovlivnit udělený souhlas hostitelského 
státu s ICSID arbitráží. Standardizované typy doložek v BITs bývají také využívány národními 
soudy hostitelského státu k uplatnění svého vlivu v daném investičním sporu. Pokud 
se hostitelský stát úspěšně dovolá uplatnění takovýchto doložek v investiční arbitráži, 
ve svém důsledku mohou tyto doložky vést až k odepření jurisdikce ICSID rozhodčího 
tribunálu. 
ICSID Úmluva i jednotlivé BITs společně zakládají hmotněprávní i procesněprávní 
ochranu zahraničních investic, přičemž vypovězení kterékoli ze těchto mezinárodních smluv 
hostitelským státem může nepříznivě ovlivnit jurisdikci ICSID tribunálu a umožnit 
tak hostitelskému státu vyhnout se případné právní odpovědnosti ze svého protiprávního 
jednání. Vlna výpovědí ICSID Úmluvy státy Jižní Ameriky dala vzniknout rozsáhlým diskusím 
o důsledcích vypovězení Úmluvy především ve vztahu k jurisdikci ratione temporis 
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a ratione voluntatis. Protichůdné názory vyústily ve vydávání vzájemně si odporujících 
rozhodčích nálezů ICSID tribunálů v jurisdikčních záležitostech spojených s výpovědí ICSID 
Úmluvy. Vlna výpovědí ICSID Úmluvy v Jižní Americe byla nadále doprovázena 
jednostranným vypovídáním BITs, které dále umocnilo již tak rozporuplné diskuse. 
ICSID tribunály se ve svých rozhodnutích snaží obtížně balancovat odlišné interpretační 
přístupy, které buď excesivním způsobem chrání investory před svévolným vypovídáním 
mezinárodních dohod o ochraně investic ze strany hostitelského státu, nebo naopak dovolují 
hostitelskému státu jednostranně se vyvázat z ICSID Úmluvy bez jakékoli následků. 
 Jednostranné vypovídání mezinárodních dohod o ochraně investic sice na první pohled 
představuje vyšší riziko narušení procesněprávní ochrany zahraničních investic, mezinárodní 
investiční právo však poskytuje ochranu investorům skrze speciální instituty, které zabraňují 
nepříznivým důsledkům pramenících z jednostranných výpovědí. Oproti tomu konsenzuální 
ukončování BITs dohodou stran může zdaleka více nepříznivě ovlivnit ochranu investic 
než je tomu v případě jednostranného vypovězení, což se projevilo například na nedávných 
změnách procesněprávní ochrany mezinárodních investic v rámci Evropské Unie. 
Nejvýraznějším příkladem zavádějícího konsenzuálního charakteru ukončování mezinárodních 
smluv dohodou stran je kolektivní ukončení více jak 277 BITs uzavřených mezi členskými státy 
Evropské Unie. Tato konsenzuální dohoda o ukončení ve svém důsledku zbavila zahraniční 











The international investment arbitration proceedings under the Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (“ICSID arbitration proceedings” and “ICSID Convention”) represents predominantly 
used mechanism of Investor-state dispute settlement. The adjudicative system of investment 
arbitration resolving disputes concerning breaches of foreign investment protection within 
the territory of the host states granted by bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) faces increasing 
criticism. The reluctance to abide by the binding awards of the arbitral tribunals on behalf 
of the host states and evolving displeasure towards the ICSID arbitration system triggered 
the wave of terminations of international investment agreements initiated by the states 
of the Latin America. Termination of international investment agreements significantly 
disturbs the procedural protection of foreign investments and ultimately deprives the foreign 
investors of the right to have their claims against the host states heard in designated arbitration 
forum. 
The ICSID arbitration proceedings are characteristic for the interconnection 
between international investment agreements, particularly the ICSID Convention and the BITs, 
jointly imposing various requirements and conditions necessary for establishing 
of the jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunal over particular investment dispute. The peculiar triangular 
nature of legal relationships forming the complex international investment dispute requires 
extensive legal analyses regarding the provided consents of parties to ICSID arbitration 
proceedings, the sine qua non of any dispute settlement mechanism. The provided consent 
to arbitration may be indirectly influenced by various types of standardised clauses 
incorporated in the BITs, by which the national courts of the host states strive to interfere in 
the particular investment dispute. Reliance on such standardised clauses by the host state 
may in particular cases ultimately abrogate the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal.  
As both substantive and procedural protection of foreign investment is governed 
by the ICSID Convention and the respective BITs, termination of any of the stated international 
treaties by the host state is able to adversely affect jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal and allow 
the host state to potentially evade his responsibilities arising from his unlawful conduct. 
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention by states in the Latin America resulted in extensive 
legal discussions regarding its effects on jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione voluntatis, 
leading to contradictory decisions of the ICSID Tribunals. The wave of denunciations 
in the Latin America was accompanied by unilateral terminations of the BITs, amplifying 
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the legal debates even further. The ICSID Tribunals struggle to balance between the divergent 
approaches that either overprotect the foreign investors from deliberate terminations or enable 
the host state to exit from the ICSID Convention without any consequences.  
Even though the unilateral terminations seem to impose higher risk on procedural 
protection of the foreign investments, in practice the international investment law provide 
important safeguard institutes securing the protection of foreign investors from the harsh effects 
of unilateral termination. On the other hand, as may be illustrated on recent changes 
in procedural investment protection regime within the European Union, the consensual 
termination of the BITs may even more adversely affect the protection of investments 
than any unilateral termination. The most prominent example of deceptive character 
of consensual termination is collective termination of over 277 BITs between the member states 
of the EU, depriving the foreign investors of access to arbitration forums with highly disputed 
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